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ABSTRACT
The Optical Bust Switching (OBS) network has become one of the most
promising switching technologies for building the next-generation of internet
backbone infrastructure. However, OBS networks still face a number of security
and Quality of Service (QoS) challenges, particularly from Burst Header Packet
(BHP) flooding attacks. In OBS, a core switch handles requests, reserving one of
the unoccupied channels for incoming data bursts (DB) through BHP. An
attacker can exploit this fact and send malicious BHP without the corresponding
DB. If unresolved, threats such as BHP flooding attacks can result in low
bandwidth utilization, limited network performance, high burst loss rate, and
eventually, denial of service (DoS). In this dissertation, we focus our
investigations on the network security and QoS in the presence of BHP flooding
attacks. First, we proposed and developed a new security model that can be
embedded into OBS core switch architecture to prevent BHP flooding attacks.
The countermeasure security model allows the OBS core switch to classify the
ingress nodes based on their behavior and the amount of reserved resources not
being utilized. A malicious node causing a BHP flooding attack will be blocked
by the developed model until the risk disappears or the malicious node redeems
iv

itself. Using our security model, we can effectively and preemptively prevent a
BHP flooding attack regardless of the strength of the attacker. In the second part
of this dissertation, we investigated the potential use of machine learning (ML) in
countering the risk of the BHP flood attack problem. In particular, we proposed
and developed a new series of rules, using the decision tree method to prevent
the risk of a BHP flooding attack. The proposed classification rule models were
evaluated using different metrics to measure the overall performance of this
approach. The experiments showed that using rules derived from the decision
trees did indeed counter BHP flooding attacks, and enabled the automatic
classification of edge nodes at an early stage. In the third part of this dissertation,
we performed a comparative study, evaluating a number of ML techniques in
classifying edge nodes, to determine the most suitable ML method to prevent
this type of attack. The experimental results from a preprocessed dataset related
to BHP flooding attacks showed that rule-based classifiers, in particular decision
trees (C4.5), Bagging, and RIDOR, consistently derive classifiers that are more
predictive, compared to alternate ML algorithms, including AdaBoost, Logistic
Regression, Naïve Bayes, SVM-SMO and ANN-MultilayerPerceptron. Moreover,
the harmonic mean, recall and precision results of the rule-based and tree
classifiers were more competitive than those of the remaining ML algorithms.
Lastly, the runtime results in ms showed that decision tree classifiers are not only
v

more predictive, but are also more efficient than other algorithms. Thus, our
findings show that decision tree identifier is the most appropriate technique for
classifying ingress nodes to combat the BHP flooding attack problem.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
The Optical Burst Switching (OBS) network is a promising switching
technology for building the next generation of Internet infrastructure. It typically
represents a trade-off between two switching technologies: optical circuit
switching (OCS) and optical packet switching (OPS). Even with all the OBS's
network merits, such as resiliency, bandwidth/resources efficiency, and overall
economic advantages, OBS networks still suffer from several quality of service
(QoS) and security issues, such as burst loss due to bursts contention, bursts
scheduling, and most importantly, Denial of Service (DoS) due to Burst Header
Packet (BHP) flooding attacks.
A BHP flooding attack can subjugate the core switches by sending a large
number of BHPs into the network. Normally, when a core switch receives a BHP,
it reserves a WDM channel for it and changes the status of the reserved channel
from unoccupied to occupied. Attackers use this to flood the network with
malicious BHPs without sending the corresponding data. The target node
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will blindly reserve a new WDM channel for each incoming malicious BHP
without checking if the corresponding data arrives. When a legitimate request
comes to the compromised core switch, there will be no unoccupied WDM
channels available. This leads to preventing legitimate nodes from reserving the
required network resources at the intermediate core switch [2], eventually
causing a DoS attack.
The main motivation for this research is to examine the behavior of edge
nodes to counter the risks associated with BHP flood attacks in OBS
networks. This can develop efficient security techniques that can manage the
problem, as well as providing contributions to enhance the QoS in OBS network.
Furthermore, we aim to examine the applicability of machine learning (ML) to
the problem of BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks. This is to develop a more
efficient detection system enabling the core switches to classify ingress nodes in
an automated manner, and identify misbehaving ones as early as possible. To
achieve this, we extensively investigated various ML techniques that adopt
different learning approaches to the research problem considered. We seek to
identify the most relevant ML technique(s) to solve the issue of BHP flooding
attacks, in addition to revealing the reasons behind the relevancy.

2

1.2 Problem Overview

1.2.1 Countering Burst Header Packet Flooding Attacks in Optical Burst
Switching Networks
The study of detection techniques of BHP flooding attack is very limited
for OBS networks. This type of attack, which relies on the flooding approach, has
been studied in traditional DoS against the TCP protocol [9, 10]. For instance, the
SYN flooding attack intends to exhaust the resources of the TCP/IP stack (e.g. the
backlog) of the victim host by generating enormous numbers of SYN requests
towards it without completing a connection setup. The victim host will be unable
to accept legitimate connection requests if its backlog is fully occupied by all the
fake half-opened connections [11]. However, in the context of UDP protocol over
an OBS network, there is no such study on preventing or even limiting BHP
flooding attacks that we are aware of. Therefore, it is important to be able to
monitor or study the behavior of edge nodes in an OBS network in the likelihood
of dealing with such threats.
In this part of the study, we propose and develop a new security
system that can be added to OBS core node architecture to prevent BHP flood
attacks. The countermeasure security system allows the OBS core node to classify
the ingress nodes, based on both their behavior, and the amount of reserved
resources not being utilized. A malicious node causing a BHP flooding attack
3

will be blocked by the system until the threat is resolved. The system is
implemented, tested and verified using a modified NCTUNS simulator. The
analysis shows that this is highly effective in preventing BHP flooding attacks, as
well as in providing the network resources for the legitimate nodes. 
1.2.2. Decision Tree Rule Learning Approach to Counter Burst Header Packet
Flooding Attacks in Optical Burst Switching Networks
Machine Learning (ML) is a widely adopted and powerful data analysis
technique which has displayed a highly predictive performance in multiple
application domains, due to its ability to discover useful hidden knowledge that
can be beneficial for decision making. However, a key challenge in adopting ML
to counter BHP flood attacks is the unavailability of the training datasets.
Therefore, this study is two-fold. Firstly,itdeterminesanddevelopsadatasetfrom
thousands of simulation runs that can be converted into a classification task.
Secondly, it investigates the use of a predictive model using ML to counter the
risk of BHP flooding attack dilemmas experienced in OBS networks, proposing a
tree-based decision architecture as an appropriate solution.
Few related studies have used ML techniques within OBS networks [40,
50]. These studies centred on data traffic identification, whereas our study is
concerned with an entirely different issue – BHP flooding attacks. To the best of
our knowledge, this study is the first to offer proposals and to develop a
4

decision-tree method of classification to solve the issue of BHP flooding attacks
in OBS networks. Since previous studies have not used ML as a way of blocking
misbehaving edge nodes which send DBs in OBS networks, we believe a solution
is needed in order to address this critical issue in the initial phases of BHP
flooding attacks.
1.2.3 Detecting BHP-Flooding Attacks in OBS Networks: A Machine Learning
Prospective
A powerful and promising approach in identifying misbehaving edge
nodes causing BHP flooding attacks is Machine Learning (ML), and in particular,
classification techniques. A classification technique learns models by applying
them to a large historical dataset derived from an edge node’s performance
during a simulation run. The dataset contains behavior traces from a number of
edge nodes, with respect to input data characteristics, sensitivity, efficiency
performance, predictive performance, and model content. The learned model can
then be utilized to single out (classify) misbehaving edge nodes based on their
future performance as accurately as possible, hence disciplining them. Therefore,
this part of the study investigates the BHP problem by evaluating a number of
ML techniques in classifying edge nodes, and determines the most suitable
method to prevent this type of attack.

5

This study evaluates Decision Tree (C4.5), Bagging, Boosting (AdaBosst),
Probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), Rule Induction (RIpple DOwn Rule Learner-RIDOR),
Neural Network (NN-MultilayerPerceptron), Logistic Regression, and Support
Vector Machine-Sequential Minimal Optimization (SVM-SMO) on a real dataset
to identify the most appropriate method(s) to combat the BHP flood attack
problem in OBS networks. 

1.3 Overview of Dissertation
We will address some of the problems facing OBS networks. The
organization of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a background on BHP flooding attacks, and proposes
a new security model, the node classifier, to counter BHP flooding attacks. We
implemented a sophisticated data structure comprised of two layers, with the
use of an adaptive sliding range window to classify ingress nodes into three
varieties. This classification is based on the number of lost bursts from each
ingress node during the time frame, to measure the performance of nodes and
detect BHP flooding attacks at preliminary classes. The simulation results show
that our proposed classifier is effective in preventing BHP flooding attacks.
Chapter 3 investigates the applicability of the predictive model, using ML
to counter the risk of BHP flooding attacks experienced in OBS networks, and
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proposing a decision-tree based architecture as an appropriate solution. This
architecture contains a learning algorithm that extracts novel rules from tree
models using data processed from several simulation runs. Our simulation
results show that the rules derived from our learning algorithm are able to
accurately classify 93% of the BHP flooding attacks into either Behaving (B) or
Misbehaving (M) classes. Moreover, the rules can further categorize the
Misbehaving edge nodes into four sub-class labels of Misbehaving-Block (Block),
Behaving-No Block (No Block), Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), and
Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait) with 87% accuracy. The results clearly show that
our proposed decision-tree model is a viable solution in comparison to decisions
undertaken by expert domains or human network administrators.
Chapter 4 builds on our previous work from Chapter 3. One method
to prevent a BHP flood attack is to detect the misbehaving edge nodes
overloading the network with malicious BHPs, and take the proper action to
secure and sustain the QoS performance in an OBS network using ML. This
chapter investigates the BHP flood attack problem by evaluating a number of
ML techniques in classifying edge nodes, and determines the most suitable
method to prevent this type of attack. To be precise, we evaluate Decision Tree
(C4.5), Bagging, Boosting (AdaBosst), Probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), Rule
Induction (RIpple DOwn Rule Learner-RIDOR), Neural Network (NN7

MultilayerPerceptron), Logistic Regression, and Support Vector MachineSequential Minimal Optimization (SVM-SMO) on a real dataset to identify
the most effective method(s) to combat the BHP flood attack problem in
OBS networks.
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CHAPTER 2
COUNTERING BURST HEADER PACKET FLOODING ATTACK IN OPTICAL
BURST SWITCHING NETWORKS

2.1 Background
Optical network is a modern network technology for transmitting
information from one place to another by sending light through an optical fiber.
The light forms an electromagnetic carrier wave that is modulated to carry
information [1]. These features of optical networks provide high speed and huge
bandwidth, which make optical networks a viable choice of the Internet
backbone infrastructure [1]. The popularity of optical networks has led to the
replacement of traditional copper wires by optical network fibers, and has also
motivated many enterprises to invest in optical burst switching (OBS) network in
particular within the past few years.
OBS network is a promising switching technology for building the nextgeneration Internet infrastructure [2, 3, 4]. It represents a trade-off between two
switching technologies: optical circuit switching [2] and optical packet switching
[3]. It uses one-way signaling scheme with an out-of-band method, which mean
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the burst header packet (BHP) is sent in a separate channel from the data burst
(DB) channel. OBS is designed for a better utilization of wavelengths in order to
minimize the latency (setup delay) and avoid the use of the optical buffers [4].

OBS transmission technique keeps the data in the optical domain and
allows for sophisticated electronic processing of control header information at
another domain. As illustrated in Figure 2.1 (a), the transmission works by
assembling the incoming data traffic from clients at the edge node (called ingress)
of the OBS network into what is called data burst (DB). Then a BHP, which
contains the information about the DB packets, including the burst length, arrival

Figure 2.1 (a) Assembling of packets at an ingress node; (b) BHP (O-E-O)
conversion at a core switch to allocate the resources for the incoming data burst
in OBS networks.
time, offset time, etc., is transmitted ahead over a devoted Wavelength Division
Multiplexing (WDM) channel (out-of-band). The BHP precedes the DB by a time
known as offset time in order to reserve the required resources and to set up the
path configuration for the DBs in the core switches [5]. The BHP goes through
10

the Optical-Electronic-Optical (O-E-O) conversion at each intermediate node and
is processed electronically to allocate the resources for the incoming data burst
into the optical domain [6, 7] as shown in Figure 2.1 (b). OBS data bursts may
have different lengths, and encompass many types of traffic (IP packets, ATM
cells, optical packets, etc.). The ingress sends the data in the form of bursts which
will be disassembled at the destination edge router (called egress).
Even with all its merits, OBS networks like any other communication
networks can suffer from several threats. Some of the known threats are orphan
bursts, redirection of data bursts, replay, BHP flooding attack, fake burst header
attack and denial of service attack [8].
In this work, we are interested in the denial of service (DoS) that can be
caused by BHP flooding attack, and aim to prevent a legitimate BHP from
reserving the required network resources at the intermediate core switch. This
type of attack relies on the flooding approach that has been studied in traditional
DoS against the TCP protocol [9, 10]. For instance, the SYN flooding attack
intends to exhaust the resources of the TCP/IP stack (e.g. the backlog) of the
victim host by generating enormous numbers of SYN requests toward the victim
host without completing connection setup. The victim host will be unable to
accept legitimate connection requests if its backlog is fully occupied by all the
fake half-opened connections [11].
11

In a similar way, the BHP flooding attack can subjugate the core switches
when a malicious node sends large numbers of BHPs into the network without
transmitting the actual DBs. When a core switch reserves WDM channels for the
incoming BHPs, it changes the status of the reserved channels from unoccupied
to occupied. Figure 2.2 demonstrates that when the target node (a core switch)
receives malicious BHPs, the target node starts reserving new WDM channel for

Figure 2.2 BHP Flooding attack on core switches in an OBS networks.
each malicious BHP. This prevents a legitimate BHP from reserving the required
network resources at the intermediate core switch [2]. When a legitimate DB
arrives and there are no unoccupied WDM channels available, the arrived DB
will be dropped by the core switch and the reserved channels will be waiting for
unidentified bursts which may never arrive [12].
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This paper proposes a new security model, called the node classifier, which
is designed to counter BHP flooding attacks. The proposed model has an
adaptive sliding range window to classify ingress nodes into three classes. This
classification will be based on the number of lost burst from each ingress node
during time window to measure the performance of nodes and detect BHP
flooding attack at preliminary classes.

2.2 Design of the Proposed Security Model
In this section, we present our proposed security model designed for BHP
flooding countermeasure, and it is illustrated in Figure 2.3. In order to combat
BHP flooding attacks, we study and analyze the behavior of each node to
discover the point when the node is misbehaving. This can be considered an alert
to prevent the malicious BHPs from reserving the network resources. The
proposed security model has several merits summarized as follows:
 It only requires software modification and implementation, and does not
require additional hardware.
 It is easy to be integrated with existing core switches architecture.
 It is not necessary to modify all the core switches at once for the model to
effectively work. Incremental deployment of the model can still enhance the
security of the OBS network.
13

The model works by classifying all the ingress nodes into three possible
classes, namely Trusted, Suspicious, and Blocked. Initially, the model classifies all
the nodes into the Trusted class. As time goes on, the classifier changes the class
assignment of each ingress node based on its observed performance such as

Figure 2.3 The classification process of the proposed model.
packet arrival rate and packet dropping rate using a sliding range window. For
example, if a node is acting normally by sending the BHP with its corresponding
DB on the expected time (BHP arrival time + offset time), the node will be
assigned to the Trusted class. However, when the ingress node at some point
does not send a predefined number of corresponding DBs within the expected
time, the classifier assigns Suspicious class to the node. In cases when the
transmitted data do not arrive at all and the packet dropping rate keeps
increasing, the ingress node will then be assigned to the Blocked class, hence
subsequent BHPs from this node will no longer be accepted and none of the
available resource will be reserved for this node. Lastly, in cases of any BHP
14

flooding attack, the classifier will eventually add the compromised node to the
blocked list.
An ingress node can redeem itself from the Blocked and Suspicious classes
back to Trusted by improving its throughput and lowering the packet dropping
rate, i.e. stopping the BHP flooding attacks. In typical BHP attack, the attacking
ingress node keeps sending the bogus BHPs. In this case, the core switches that
place this attacking node in the Blocked class will not be able to forward its BHPs
and will not allow the node to be allocated network resources. However, when
the blocked node stops sending bogus BHPs and starts sending legitimate DBs,
the arrived DBs will be used to redeem the node from the Blocked class.

2.3 Implementation
In this section, we discuss the implementation of our classification model
in detail, and introduce its three main components (data structure, sliding range
window, and classifier).

2.3.1 Data Structure
The model’s data structure is composed of two layers. The first layer
allows a core switch to store and maintain information about each connected
port (representing an ingress node) including the following fields:
1) Port ID.
15

2) Class: The class currently assigned to this ingress node (i.e. Trusted,
Suspicious, Blocked)
3) Ingress node array size: The size of the array for each ingress node. The size
will be incremented by each received BHP and decremented by each
dropped BHP from the array.
4) The number of dropped BHPs: This parameter keeps account of how many
BHPs from each ingress node have been dropped based on the sliding
range window.
5) BHP Array: A pointer to the array of the BHPs. The array will be created
dynamically for memory management purpose.
The second layer of the model’s data structure is used to store information
about the BHPs received from each incoming node (ingress node or core switch),
including the following fields:
1) BHP_ID: This item is used to check which BHP does and does not have
corresponding data burst received.
2) Offset Time: This is the time after which a BHP is considered part of a
flooding attack when no more data arrive

16

The primary reason of using this data structure is to efficiently manage
and store the data regarding each connected node. Figure 2.4 depicts a bird’s eye
view of this data structure management process.

Figure 2.4 The proposed data structure component of the proposed security
model.
2.3.2 Sliding Range Window
The proposed classification model utilizes a sliding range window scheme
that is implemented as a circular queue. The window enables the classifier to
monitor the behavior of each connected node over short and long periods to
assign the appropriate and accurate class to each node.
The size of the window and the number of slots within the window need
to be considered and configured carefully. Since most network performance
17

metrics such as throughput or dropping rate are usually calculated in the unit of
seconds, e.g. transmitted bytes per second, a natural choice of the window size is
one second. However, a congestion or unexpected high dropping in data traffic
may happen wherein the number of dropped DB may fluctuate in each slot. For
example, consider the following worst case scenario in which only one BHP is
transmitted in one second and the corresponding DB has not arrived, the result is
100% dropped packet rate in this period. Our classifier will block the node since
the expected DB did not arrive. For this reason, we have to monitor the behavior
of the edge nodes over short and long periods of time by computing packet
dropping rate in each time slot using a sliding range window.
Moreover, the time range threshold cannot be set too long such that the
attacker can flood the network within a short period of time and then
discontinue doing so without being detected. Further, the time range cannot be
set too short either, otherwise we cannot accurately determine the behavior of the
node. Hence, in the case of Trusted class, we divide the window (one second)
into 10 slots (one tenth of a second for each slot) during experimentations,
whereas in the cases of Suspicious and Blocked classes, we double the number of
time slots to 20 to closely monitor the node behavior.
Within the sliding range window, there are multiple counters for
calculating the numbers of transmitted and dropped BHPs. We define W S and
18

WE as the start and end of the sliding range window, respectively. The sliding
range window method often finds the total number of dropped and arrived DB
packets per slot using transmitted BHPs per slot, and it calculates the dropped
packets rate per slot or over the entire window. Our model considers each time
slot and the entire window range W (one second) to monitor the behavior of the
ingress nodes. Subsequently, each ingress node will be assigned a class based on
its packet dropping rate.
Figure 2.5(a) shows an example of counting the number of harmful BHPs
that its corresponding DB have not been received for a short period (i.e. per slot),
such as ((0 = slot 1), (6 = slot 2), (5 = slot 3)). Figure 2.5(b) also illustrates the
number of harmful BHPs for a long period (i.e. per second), such as (S1 through
S10).

Figure 2.5 (a) Number of dropped DBs in each slot or cycle; (b) number of
dropped DBs for one second; 0 indicates no DBs has been dropped.
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2.3.3

Classifier
The basic idea of the classification model is to detect harmful ingress node

at preliminary classes. However, what is the appropriate criterion for judging
whether a node is under a BHP flooding attack? Based on previous research
studies, i.e. [32, 33], a consistent high utilization of the network resources
normally greater than 40% is an indication of network’s performance
deterioration. Moreover, link utilization ratio (the link’s bandwidth being
currently utilized by the network traffic) is another indicator of possible threats
to the node. The node utilization can be calculated according to [33] using
equation (1)
Utilization % = (data bits x 100) / (bandwidth x interval)

(1)

The above two observations are typically used as indicators when a node
is under a possible threat. In our model, we use 40% BHPs that do not have
corresponding DB packets received as a threshold for blocking attacks. This is
since 40% of the resources are reserved by malicious BHPs and are unused. This
is a condition where we can be confident that the network is under BHP flooding
attack. Note that this condition is distinguishable from network congestion, since
in a congested network not only DB packets will be dropped, but BHPs as well.
When using the 40% utilization as the single boundary of judging whether BHP
flooding attack this may risk ignoring normal packet dropping cases such as
20

network congestion. Therefore, we split the 40% threshold into two ranges, in
which the first 20% is considered trustworthy, and the second 20% is considered
suspicious but allowing the node a chance to redeem itself as trustworthy again
once the abnormality disappears. We define the class assignment value of the
node using the following rules:
 Trusted if:
80%  ArrivedRate  100%.
 Suspicious if: 60%  ArrivedRate < 80%.
 Blocked if:
ArrivedRate < 60%.
Algorithm: Assign Node Class
Input:
Output :
Preprocessing:

Edge Router Number
Node Class
Data Structure and Sliding Window are populated with
edge router information

STEP 1

Check Class
IF (Edge Router has NO Class) THEN RETURN
TRUSTED

STEP 2

Calculate from each slot in the sliding window
Total number of dropped packets (DP)
Total number of arrived packets (AP)

STEP 3

Calculate percentage of packet drop rate
PDR ← (DP / DP+AP) * 100

STEP 4

Assign node class by checking
IF
(PDR  20) THEN Class ← TRUSTED
ELSE IF (PDR  40) THEN Class ← SUSPICIOUS
ELSE
Class ← BLOCKED

STEP 5

RETURN Class
Figure 2.6 the process of classifying nodes
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Figure 2.6 shows the algorithm process of classifying nodes. The
procedure uses the sliding range window explained earlier and the classifier to
assign each node its appropriate value.

2.4

Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we explain the simulation setup and experimental results

of our model. The simulation is conducted on a modified version of NCTUns
network simulator to evaluate the performance of the proposed classifier [32].
The topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 2.7, which contains eight
core switches (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) to simulate an OBS network, two ingress edge
routers (2, 11), one egress edge router (12), one legitimate sender (1), one receiver

Figure 2.7 OBS network topology used in evaluation.
(14) and one attacker (13). It is worth to note that the attacker node can be located
in different places of the topology, but we choose to place it near the destination
in order to emphasize its effect and because the probability of remaining
undetected is high. Moreover, although our classifier can handle any number of
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ingress nodes and any number of attackers, in our experiments we use only one
legitimate ingress node and one attacker. This is because we are interested in
testing our classifier against the BHP flooding attack rather than testing the
possible congestion in this topology.
Table 2.1 shows the simulation parameters for the OBS network
configuration. As for the traffic files, we created ten trace files with incremental
traffic load rate (0.1 Gbps, 0.2 Gbps, 0.3 Gbps, …, 1 Gbps respectively, where 1
Gbps is the maximum rate allowed by the simulator for each node) which
represent the traffic transmitted by the legitimate sender.

Table 2.1
NCTUns Network Simulator parameter of the OBS Network configuration
in evaluation
Parameter
Link bandwidth
Propagation delay
Bit error rate
Maximum burst length
Number of BHP channels
Number of DB channels
Use of Wavelength Conversion
Use of Fiber Delay Line (FDL)
Transport Layer Protocol

Value
1000Mb/s
1 μs
0
15000 bytes
1
1
No
No
UDP

We conducted experiments based on a BHP flooding attacker of varied
strengths to evaluate and compare our classifier with the default scheme which
has no security measures. The objectives of these experiments are twofold:
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1. Firstly, we want to observe the impact of BHP flooding attack on
legitimate traffic when no security measure is employed;
2. Secondly, we want to evaluate the effectiveness of our classifier in
preventing the BHP flooding attack.
We start with a lightweight attacker with 0.2 Gbps load. By attacker’s load
we refer to the network resources collectively requested by the harmful BHPs
sent by the attacker. Lightweight is relative to the traffic loads of other trace files
used in our experiments. To increase the difficulty of detection, we make the
attacker randomly flood the intermediate core switch with a random load of
malicious BHPs with different interval time, and let the average attacker load
reaches 0.2 Gbps. We test this lightweight attacker against all 10 trace files, with
each trace file run three times and calculate the average. The results in terms of

Figure 2.8 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence
of 0.2 Gbps load of malicious BHPs.
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packet dropping rate are shown in Figure 2.8. From this figure we can see that at
the beginning when the legitimate traffic load is not very high, the packet
dropping rate for the default scheme is not high. This is because the attacker load
is relatively low which still leaves much bandwidth available for the legitimate
traffic. The dropping rate of legitimate traffic starts at 26% and stabilizes to
around 55% as the legitimate traffic load increases to 1 Gbps. This is expected
since the legitimate traffic load becomes gradually higher than the attacker load
and will request more bandwidth, which, however, has been falsely reserved by
the attacker.
The packet dropping rate of our classifier remains low, only around 1%.
This is because our classifier detects the misbehaving node and assigns it to the
Blocked class. Once the system blocks the attacking node, all the resources
requested by the legitimate ingress node are granted and hence the packet
dropping rate becomes low even for high traffic loads. The 1% of dropped
packets is due to the period when the attacker was not yet classified into the
Blocked class at the beginning of the simulation and was granted the resources
requested by the bad BHPs, which leads to the slight dropping of legitimate
packets at the initial phase.

We continue testing with a medium-strength attacker with a load of 0.5
Gbps, and a powerful attacker with a load of 1 Gbps, which is the maximum load
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allowed by the simulator for each node. The results for these two cases are
shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 respectively. For the default scheme, the packet
dropping rate demonstrates similar trend as in Figure 2.8, except that the stable

Figure 2.9 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence of
0.5 Gbps load of malicious BHPs.
packet dropping rate is around 80% for the medium-strength attacker, and
around 90% for the powerful attacker. These results are reasonable since higher
attacker load gives the attacker a better chance to reserve the DB channel for
longer time and may result in higher packet dropping rate for the legitimate
traffic. By contrast, both Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show that for our classifier, the
packet dropping rate remains as low as between 1% and 5%, which clearly
demonstrates the effectiveness of our classifier in stopping the BHP flooding
attack.
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Overall, the experimental results lead us to reach the following two
conclusions. Firstly, if the BHP flooding attacker is more powerful to transmit its
bad BHPs to request network resources at a higher rate, it can cause more
legitimate DB packets to be dropped. Secondly, our classifier can effectively

Figure 2.10 Comparison of percentage of lost packets number in the presence of
1.0 Gbps load of malicious BHPs.
prevent the BHP flooding attack regardless of the strength of the attacker.
Furthermore, the model relies on detecting/preventing the BHP flooding attack
in time which makes our classifier model perform better.

2.5

Related Studies
In OBS network, there are several potential threats including traffic

analysis, eavesdropping, spoofing, data burst redirection attack, burst
duplication attack, replay attack, burstification attack, land attack and BHP
flooding attack [8]. In this section, the focus will be on discussing security issues
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related to OBS network and present common threats particularly DoS flooding
attacks based on the protocol level.
In traffic analysis or eavesdropping attack, the attacker attempts to gain or
access some unauthorized information about the target node by passively
listening to the communication. The attacker in OBS can scan for an open
vulnerability, and then intercepts active BHPs in order to compromise the
corresponding data burst. When BHP gets compromised, the attacker will be able
to analyze and monitor the transmitted information from the compromised BHPs
which may expose him to the transparent DBs that contain the critical
information. Passive attackers are hard to detect and can be seen a true troubling
threat in OBS networks. In [13, 14, 15], the authors propose prevention
techniques to overcome this type of attacks.
In data burst redirection attack, the attacker injects a malicious BHP into
the OBS network, causing the corresponding DB to be redirected to unauthorized
destination. In OBS network, a DB is configured to follow the optical routing
path set up by its associated BHP, but it is not able to authenticate the routing
path of the BHP. If a malicious BHP is injected into the OBS network at a time
such as offset time, any active DB can be misdirected to an unauthorized
destination. The authors of [2], [12], [16] developed solutions to fight data burst
redirection attacks.
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In burstification attack, the attacker can compromise the ingress node by
changing the DB size value that was originally recorded in the BHP. Then the
actual DB could be mishandled as a different DB value according to the modified
BHP, in which the receiving node will have to inquire for retransmission of the
burst. This attack can happen at both edge (including ingress and egress) and
core switches. The attacker will compromise the ingress node and modifies the
burst size value to a larger size, such that the burst reservation time will increase,
resulting in longer propagation delay and increased burst setup latency. In [17],
the authors thoroughly discussed the burstification besides other threats that
may occur on optical nodes.
In land attack, the attacker compromises a node by making a copy of the
BHP, modifying its destination address to the source address, and injecting the
modified BHP into the OBS network. The result is that the corresponding data
burst will reach the intended destination and the source itself. Due to this attack,
some network resources will be wasted in sending the data burst back to the
source, which in turn will cause some restriction on the sending resource in the
best possible behavior. In [18], the authors discussed in details this type of attack.
Research works more relevant to ours include [9, 10], [19], whose authors
also addressed the problem of preventing BHP flooding attacks that may cause
DoS. For instance, the authors of [9] proposed a new flow filtering architecture
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that operates at the optical layer to filter out flooding attacks at early stages. The
filtering process is performed based on comparing the offset time included in the
BHP and the actual delay between this BHP and the associated DB. However,
due to the high traffic rates in optical networks, the proposed flow filtering
mechanisms cannot be effectively applied.
In [10], the authors study the denial of service attack resulting from BHP
flooding attack in the resources reservation protocols. The proposed
countermeasure module uses the concept of optical codewords to optically filter
the fake BHP and identify the compromised source node in the network. This
module can work at the edge node but it cannot optically filter the fake BHP at
the core switch. Moreover, the module does not perform any system validation
at the core switch to evaluate the performance of each connected node in the
network

based

on

packet

arrival

rate/packet

dropping

rate

and

allowing/blocking security rules.
In [19], the authors proposed a prevention mechanism to detect BHP
flooding attack in TCP over OBS network. This mechanism is limited based on
the statistical data collected from packets, and the threshold is not well defined
to justify whether the behavior of the node is normal or under an attack.
Moreover, the solution proposed by the authors increases the end-to-end delay
which reduces the performance of the computer network with respect to its
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associated Quality of service (QoS) variables. [19]’s prevention mechanism only
reduces the trust value of the node until it reaches a value below the threshold.
However, there is no real or immediate action to stop the attacks before they
occur.
It is worthy to note that flooding is a very common way to launch
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, in which the distributed attacking
sources simultaneously transmit an overwhelming amount of malicious
unwanted traffic toward the victim machine to congest the victim’s network and
drain the victim’s communication and computation resources. Many approaches
have been proposed to address DDoS flooding attacks, such as rate-limiting
schemes [20,21,22,23,24,25] and IP traceback schemes [26,27,28,29,30,31].
However, the main purposes of these schemes are to identify the attacking
sources and restrain them from sending excessive traffic. By contrast, the
problem with BHP flooding attacks is that the attacking sources, whose identities
are already known to the core switches, do not send out the corresponding data
burst traffic after sending BHPs to reserve network bandwidth. This major
difference deems the rate-limiting and IP traceback schemes unfit for addressing
BHP flooding attacks.
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2.6

Summary
In this work, we proposed a new security classification model for

countering BHP flooding attack with an adaptive sliding range window to detect
nodes based on their behavior. The classifier enables core switches to measure
the performance of incoming nodes and detect BHP flooding attack. The
simulation results show that our proposed classifier is effective in preventing
BHP flooding attack. They show that the overall packet dropping rate when the
classifier is used is less than 5% in all traffic load cases under BHP flooding
attack. This is a remarkable improvement over the default scheme that employs
no security measures, which results in up to 90% packet dropping rate. The
proposed classifier has been studied with various scenarios with different cases
to demonstrate its capability of securing the OBS network from BHP flooding
attack, such as critical links in the network. We note during experimentations
that our classifier not only can secure the core switches in the OBS network, but
also has the potential to improve the QoS performance of the OBS network. In
the near future, we will extend the solution to increase the performance of our
current model and add QoS improvement features for OBS networks based on
the node classification.
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CHAPTER 3
DECISION TREE RULE LEARNING APPROACH TO COUNTER BURST
HEADER PACKET FLOODING ATTACK IN OPTICAL BURST SWITCHING
NETWORKS
3.1 Background
An Optical Network (ON) is a common network for transmitting data
from source to destination via an optical fibre medium using light [1]. Featuring
efficient quality performance indicators such as bandwidth and speed in contrast
to traditional networks, ON is the preferable option for Internet infrastructure
[2]. In order to make use of the huge bandwidth of ON, Optical Burst Switching
(OBS) was proposed in [3] as the next generation of optical switching technology.
Once it has obtained the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packets, OBS network
will assemble the packets from the clients at the edge nodes (ingress node) into a
data burst (DB) and a burst header packet (BHP) will be transmitted in advance
in order to preserve the network resources required before the DB is actually
sent. However, an attacker can exploit this fact and can make an ingress node
(source node) overloads (flood) the network with BHPs that reserve the
resources without transmitting the actual DB [4]. It is important therefore, to
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ensure that prevention of BHP flooding attacks is set as a high priority in OBS, as
it could severely reduce the performance of the entire network and eventually
cause a Denial of Service (DoS) [5]. Despite the many advantages of the OBS
network such as resiliency, bandwidth efficiency as well as its economic benefits,
QoS and security can become issues for these networks, with consequences
including burst loss as a result of BHP flood attacks [35, 10]. Attacks of this type
are reliant on the flooding approach which has been examined in traditional DoS
against the TCP protocol [11].
A limited number of studies exist in relation to dealing with and
preventing issues caused by BHP flood attacks within OBS networks (such as, in
[9, 10, 35, 36]). For example, [9] proposed a flow filtering architecture operating
at the optical layer to filter out BHP flood attacks at an early stage. The filtering
process is performed through a comparison between the offset time included in
the BHP and the actual delay between this BHP and the associated DB. In [10],
the authors examined the issue of DoS within the resources’ reservation
protocols. This countermeasure adopts the method of using optical code words
which filter out fake BHP in order to identify the compromised source node
within the network. In [35] meanwhile, the authors proposed a prevention
method which was built by gathering statistical data from packets used to detect
a BHP flood attack in TCP within an OBS network. In [36], the authors proposed
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and developed a new security model which could be integrated within an OBS
core

switch

architecture

to

prevent

BHP

flooding

attacks.

Using

a

countermeasure security model enables the core switch of the OBS to classify the
ingress nodes according to their behaviour in addition to the amount of reserved
resources not being used. A malicious node which causes a BHP flooding attack
can be blocked using this model until the risk is disappeared. The issues with
these methods however is that they do not use the machine learning (ML)
techniques which are available to identify edge node behaviour in order to
counter the risk of BHP flooding attacks. These methods also contain their own
faults and can be limited in their execution and therefore need further
authentication.
This study will examine the problems of DoS resulting from BHP flooding
attacks in which legitimate BHPs are prevented from preserving network
resources for legitimate DBs. The ML architecture we have developed features
sets of beneficial learnings gathered from past simulations carried out using a
reduced number of features including the bandwidth used, the average packet
drop rate as well as the average delay time per second and other factors (further
details are presented in Section 3.3). One of the most encouraging data analysis
methods used by researchers for prediction is ML [37]. It features intelligent
techniques in order to complete a specific task which is usually linked to
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knowledge building or isolating patterns which are concealed [38]. Little
research exists around the classification of edge nodes in preventing BHP
flooding attacks within OBS networks. A large proportion of this research related
to classifying traffic of computer networks through the use of ML, for example
[39, 35, 40, 41], are not solely focused on the classification of BHP flood attack
within OBS networks. Through our study, we find that ML can have a vital
function in preventing BHP flood attacks, resulting in improved QoS. These
results from the prediction decision used in ML techniques rely on automated
knowledge learnt, which can impact the predisposed decisions made by users,
leading to improved predictive accuracy.
Classification is one of the most frequent ML tasks which require the
prediction of a target attribute [42]. Classification related to building a model (the
classifier) using a recorded set of data along with a number of variables using
data processing, and then using the classifier in order to predict precise attributes
(the class) within the hidden dataset [43]. In relation to the issue of BHP flooding
attacks, the edge nodes can be classified into pre-defined classes, e. g. Behaving
or Misbehaving, meaning that this issue can be classified within predictive tasks,
and of course, classification. The key objective therefore will be to forecast the
type of edge nodes involved in order to prevent the risks associated with
occupying network resources with improper use.
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Of the different classification approaches used within various domains,
the rule extraction from decision tree models is one of the most effective [44].
Decision tree models are a type of classification method which is cleverly built
using an information theory approach [45]. For example, [46] used Entropy and
Information Gain methods to build decision trees within an algorithm labelled
C4.5. Using the training dataset to form the tree, every individual path stemming
from the root node to the leaf represents a corresponding If-Then rule.
In this Chapter, we have investigated the potential of machine learning in
countering the risk of BHP flood attack problem. In particular, we have proposed
and developed a new series of rules using the decision tree method as a way to
prevent the risks of the BHP flood attack problem. Firstly, the decision tree
method proposed will build a binary classification model which can classify the
edge nodes into two classes (Behaving and Misbehaving).

Hundreds of

simulation runs were used in order to collect the data to build the binary models,
gathering the various attributes associated with how the edge nodes perform. It
worth to note that the use of only two types of classes (binary) is intended for the
researchers and developers who are interested in security of OBS networks and
want only to identify suspicion nodes (Misbehaving). Next, the classification
models were improved through splitting the Misbehaving class into further subclass labels as we desired to establish a priority procedure for data transmission
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from the edge nodes (further details provided in Section 3.4). The proposed
classification rule models were evaluated using different metrics to measure the
overall performance of this approach. The experiments showed that using rules
derived from the decision trees did indeed counter the BHP flooding attack
problem and enabled the automatic classification of edge nodes at an early stage.

3.2 BHP Flood Attack as Classification Problem
In the field of artificial intelligence, ML is regarded as one of the most
popular areas of research, and used for data analysis in various applications [42].
In recent years, researchers in the field of artificial intelligence and ML have
developed several analytical methods which are directly concerned with the
classification of datasets generated within various business areas. Some of the
ML methods include Decision Trees [46], Greedy Induction [47], Associative
Classification [43], Neural Network [47], Probabilistic [48], and Support Vector
Machines [49]. Common ML methods tend to separate classification into three
different sub-tasks, which are:


Learning: Learning involves the tasks of executing data processing on the
dataset entered. One example is the associative classification method, in
which class association rules, if they exist, are identified using an
association rule algorithm. Meanwhile, decision trees will single out the
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different input variable using Entropy (see Equation 4) in addition to a
support vector machine method tries which will recognize a clear line
within a hyper plane to identify the possible characteristics of the target
class.


Model Building: This task is related to the building of a predictive model
using the results of the previous task. The ML method will sometimes
change the results of the learning task through retaining key elements to
build the predictive model. For example, decision trees will prune
pointless branches to cut down overfitting.



Class Forecasting: This task will use the ML method to measure the built
model’s success rate in predicting the test data’s class values. The results
of this step are used to serve as the model’s error rate or establish the
negatives, model efficiency, classification accuracy and other factors.
When a core switch within an OBS network reserves the wavelength

division multiplexing (WDM) channels for the incoming BHPs, it will alter the
status of these channels from unoccupied to occupied. If a core switch becomes
the target of a BHP flooding attack and receives malicious BHPs, it will begin to
reserve new WDM channels in correspondence with each received malicious
BHP. This will prevent a legitimate BHP from reserving the essential network
resources at this intermediate core switch [2]. If a legitimate DB becomes present
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and no WDM channels are available, the core switch will drop the arrived DB,
while the reserved channels will be waiting for unidentified bursts which may
never arrive [50]. This research will focus on the BHP flooding attacks in terms of
a classification issue as it is concerned with classifying edge nodes into a single
type out of a limited number of possible class values such as Behaving or
Misbehaving. Misbehaving nodes are defined as those send BHPs at a
substantially higher rate without sending the corresponding DB.
The definition of the classification problem is based on [51]. The training
dataset is labelled as

, where

represents the combination of variables

within the training dataset aside from the class variable, and
class variable. A vector

can be assigned one of two disjoint point sets C1

or C2 within an m-dimensional feature space.
and

represents the

is the ith training data row

represents the ith class value. The aim is to derive a function, F,

that maximizes the chance that

for each test data. Two-class problem

(binary classification) is the simplest form of the classification; ci can be either -1
(Misbehaving) or 1 (Behaving). This means Function

is:
(1)

In relation to an OBS network, BHP flooding attacks can be prevented if
edge nodes are correctly classified into the appropriate types, with misbehaving
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nodes being identified. More specifically, if the determination of the edge nodes
that reserve network resources without proper use can occur in an early phase,
then these nodes can be blocked. The blocking of the edge nodes means that the
other ‘behaving’ edge nodes will be able to effectively reserve network resources,
improving the resource management and QoS of the network. To deal with this
issue, it is possible to build a model created from the edge nodes’ previous
behavior displayed during the simulations. This enables the model to be used to
automatically place the edge nodes into the right classifications in future
simulations.

3.3 The Proposed Rule-based Model for Anti-BHP-Flood Attack
In this section, we will present the proposed classification architecture and
its different phases. The various phases which must be included to promote
classification rules necessary to counter BHP flooding attacks can be seen in
Figure 3.1. In the initial phase, simulations were carried out to gather data
relevant to the edge nodes performance indicators, which was then catalogued as
the training dataset. Next, the training data set was pre-processed to remove
noise or statistical biases. Once the data is cleaned, a filtering process takes place
to detect the features which are the most influential, as well as reduce the
dimensionality of the data. After selecting the features, the decision tree
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algorithm will process the dataset to build a classification model that will then be
transformed into rule sets. Any unnecessary rules are then be pruned to
eliminate any redundant rules. The rule sets are finally applied to classify the
edge nodes into a number of pre-defined classes against new test cases that had
the same performance indicators. The following subsequent sections will explain
the proposed classification architecture in further detail.

Figure 3.1 The proposed rule based classification architecture for BHP flood
Attack
3.3.1 Understanding the Dataset
When using ML to prevent BHP flood attacks, establishing the right
training dataset from various nodes through the simulations remains a
significant challenge. The domain expert will typically identify many variables
that will directly and indirectly affect the OBS network which are also relevant to
the sending performance of the nodes. The first challenge faced is creating the
training dataset and determining the needed variables that ensure the ML
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method can be used in order to construct a predictive model. Identifying the
necessary mechanism for converting the training dataset to the task of
classification is another challenge. The initial challenge can be addressed by
recording as many variables linked to the sending nodes as possible while the
simulator is working. On the other hand, the second challenge can be addressed
by establishing a new variable, the ‘class’ within the training dataset. Values of
classes can be assigned using a knowledge base to the variable which is entered
by domain experts, which will reduce biased data cases and make the building of
the training dataset more legitimate. A comparison will be made between this
class and the proposed ML’s predicted class to establish the effectiveness of the
model in terms of accurate classification

3.3.2 Training Dataset Preparation
The right training dataset is very crucial step in order for ML algorithms
to work as indented.

To prepare the training dataset for the purpose of

identifying misbehaving nodes that are causing BHP flooding attack, numbers of
simulations were carried out in order to collect the different variables related to
the OBS network performance. Significant variables recorded include the
sending node number, allocated bandwidth, bandwidth used, bandwidth lost,
packet transmitted, packet dropping rate, packet received, transmitted byte,
received byte, average delay time per second, and the percentage of BHP
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flooding attack. For illustration purposes, Table 3.1 lists just four iterations for
two of the edge nodes.
Table 3.1
Sample four iterations of two edge nodes

Variables’ Descriptions
 Itr: The iteration number.
 Node: The edge node label.
 FB: Initial Bandwidth assigned (given) to each node, the user (usr) in the
experiments assign these values.
 UB: This is what each node could reserve from the assigned Bandwidth
from FB column. The drops here are due to congestions.
 LB: The amount of lost Bandwidth by each node from the assigned
Bandwidth at column FB.
 PSBy: Packets size in Byte assigned specifically for each node to transmit.
Note: 60 Byte will be added to the 1440 for the IP Header and the UDP
Header ((Data size 1440 Byte) + (IP Header 40 Byte) + (UDP Header 20
Byte)) =1500 Byte.
 PT: Total transmitted packets (per second) for each node based on the
assigned Bandwidth.
 PR: Total received packets (per second) for each node based on the
reserved Bandwidth.
 PL: Total lost packets (per second) for each node, which based on the lost
Bandwidth.
 ByT: Total transmitted Byte (per second) for each node.
 ByR: Total received Byte (per second) for each node based on the reserved
Bandwidth.
 ADTpS: Average Delay Time (per second) for each node. This is (End-to
End Delay).
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PDR: Percentage of Packets Drop Rate for each node.
ByLR: Percentage of Lost Byte Rate for each node.

Initially, the edge nodes were classified into only two classes, Behaving (B)
and Misbehaving (M), as the issue was to identify the misbehaving nodes that
reserve resources without the right usage and secure the network by the right
action such as blocking it. We refer to this dataset as the ‘binary dataset’ since we
have only the two classes B and M. However, to improve the presentation of
data further, and to better demonstrate the BHP flood attack scenario during the
simulations, the binary dataset was augmented and a new dataset (multi-class
dataset) was created. The target classes of the multi-class dataset was linked
with four possible sub-class labels, i.e. Behaving-No Block (No Block),
Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait), and
Misbehaving-Block (Block). These were assigned to a new column called “New
Class: Action” based on the level of BHP flood attacks for 200 runs and using two
edge nodes.
In order to increase the statistical significance of the variables by
smoothing their values and reducing the data variations or sudden drops in an
iteration for each variable, the initial dataset (binary) and the augmented dataset
(multi-class) were pre-processed. This was done by computing the average for 10
consecutive iterations per variable, and for each node as one new data instance.
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More specifically, for each node variable, the value of the data instance at its first
iteration was the first 10 consecutive values’ averages in iteration 1 to 10, while at
iteration 2, the second new instance value is iteration 2-11’s average values, etc.
Finally, the dataset’s class values were assigned by a domain expert, i.e. (B and
M) for the binary dataset and (No Block, M-No Block, M-Wait, and Block) for the
multi-class dataset. The class assignments were based on a rule of thumb on two
of the variables: the premeditated false resource utilization rate (percentage of
BHP flooding attack) and the actual packet drop rate. (For more details about the
simulation setup and the training dataset see section 3.4.1)

3.3.3 Feature Selection
Choosing which features should be used to distinguish between behaving
and misbehaving edge nodes is another challenge. However, this can be
addressed through employing feature selection methods to filter the initial data.
To determine the most relevant features in relation to the problem, a filtering
method called Chi-square testing (CHI) was applied [52] with the Correlation
Feature Set (CFS) [47] for verification.
CHI is often used as a statistics metric and has been employed for use in
both supervised and unsupervised learning applications to assess input data
features’ validity. The CHI metric will test two chosen variables to measure their
level of independence. In many cases, the target class of the input dataset will be
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one of the variables, while the normal feature will be the other. In relation to the
classification problem which is under discussion, the type of node (B, M) for the
binary dataset and (Block, No Block, M-No Block, and M-Wait) for the multiclass dataset, will be the class, while the feature could be anything from packet
drop rate, bandwidth used, packet received, or other feature. Either way, the
selected features will be unrelated to the other, although they will have
significant links to the other classes being obtained. The CHI’s correlation score is
given as:
.

(2)

Where X is the frequency feature f and class c appearing together, Y is the
frequency feature, f appears without class c, W is the frequency class c appears
without feature f, Z is the frequency neither f or c appears, and N is the number
of instances in the training dataset.
The result of the CHI was verified using CFS which is known for being a
more pessimistic form of filtering. CFS is used for verification because it has
continuous input features (numbers and decimals), as opposed to the categorical
features of CHI. Therefore, the input dataset needed to be discretized before CHI
feature selection could be used. As CFS is able to work with both categorical and
continuous features, it is important to use CFS to verify the dataset.
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3.3.3.1 Feature Selection on Binary Dataset
Table 3.2 shows the CHI scores from the processed binary dataset. It is
important to note that four input features have been disregarded as part of the
discretization process (where numeric variables are transformed into discrete
variables) – the iteration number, node number, FB, and PSBy (abbreviation
details can be found in Table 3.1). Once the CHI was applied, acceptable scores
and high correlation against the class variables were noted in the features of
Table 3.2
CHI feature selection score generated from the binary training dataset
CHI Score
161.236
153.442
53.553
53.553
53.553
51.818
51.818
51.818
33.324

Feature Name
Lost_Bandwidth
Packet_Dropping_Rate
Packet_Received
Used_Bandwidth
Received_Byte
Full_Bandwidth
Packet_Transmitted
Transmitted_Byte
Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec

“Lost Bandwidth” and “Packet Dropping Rate”. However, when applying CFS
filtering method for verification before final results are recorded, three features
seem to survive without the discretization process: “Used Bandwidth,”
“Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec,” and “Packet_Dropping_Rate”. Both filtering
methods have highlighted “Packet_Dropping_Rate”, making the feature appear
significant and so it has been retained. The “Average_Delay_Time_Per_Sec” and
“Used Bandwidth” features have also been retained. The “Lost Bandwidth” was
discarded since it is the complement for “Used Bandwidth” and it would be
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ineffective if both were kept. Finally, both the iteration number and the sending
node were also noted.
From the initial input dataset, three features (columns 3-5 in Table 3.3)
have been chosen in addition to the iteration#, Node#, and the target class, as
shown in Table 3.3. Two possible values exist for the target class: Behaving (B) or
Misbehaving (M), which can be seen in the final column in the table. Table 3.3
shows only a sample of four iterations for two of the edge nodes (9, 3) which are
sending data. Each value in the selected features represents an average value
computed from 10 sequential iterations. This is a vital step to ensure that the
statistical power is retained and bias is minimized within the node performance
results.

Table 3.3
Sample four iterations of the processed binary training dataset
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3.3.3.2 Feature Selection on Multi-Class Dataset
Table 3.4 below details the CHI scores for key variables for the multi-class
dataset. The BHP flooding attack variable however has been ignored in the data
processing phase since it has been used to construct the dataset, and thus there is
concern about overfitting the model with biased results. An over-fitted model
can generate great performance on the training dataset but a poor performance
on any unseen datasets; therefore it has been ignored in the data processing
phase. The CFS filtering method was used to verify the feature selection,
meaning that the 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate remained the CHI and CFS’s most
common variable. As a result, the selected variables were the 10-Run-AVG-DropRate and two variables selected through CHI filtering which were the 10-RunAVG-Bandwidth-Use and 10-Run-Delay.
Table 3.4
CHI feature selection score generated from the multi-class dataset
CHI Score
796
503.133
320.271
28.117

Feature Name
BHP Flood
10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate
10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use
10-Run-Delay

For illustration purposes, Table 3.5 shows how the edge nodes for every
iteration was used to send data, and included the iterations which predominately
featured misbehaving actions from both edge node. Iteration #5, for example,
shows that node 3 has been assigned class = Block, as the BHP sent by this node
did not contain data (high BHP flooding) meaning that a significant proportion
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of the BHPs had been reserved without use. However, although the same
iteration showed misbehaving actions in node 9, the node was still permitted to
transfer data (misbehaving but no block). Iteration #4 appears more complicated,
as each of the nodes shows misbehaving actions, but not at the level of a
significant BHP flood attack. As its dropping rate was smaller, node 9 was given
higher priority over node 3. Nodes with low packet dropping rates (less than 0.39
as a result of the rule already produced by the decision tree) would not be
blocked and would be allowed to send data.
Table 3.5
Sample of five iterations of the processed multi-class training dataset

After the datasets are created and pre-processed, the CHI filtering method
was used to select the important features and verified using CFS filtering
method, the next stage is to build the classification model.
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3.3.4 Construction of Classification Models
We propose an anti-BHP flooding attack classification algorithm based on
decision trees. The proposed classification approach is shown in Figure 3.2. It
separates data instances into subsets, which are further divided into smaller
divisions until the subsets are homogenous or the termination condition has been
met. If at the initial stage the data instances fit into one class (known as a pure
dataset), a single rule will result to enable prediction of that class (lines 1-3). If,
however, more than one label is associated with the training data, the
Information Gain (IG) metric (Equation 3) will be used to determine the tree’s
root node. This means the algorithm will iterate over the different attributes’
values in the training dataset to determine the attribute that has the largest
information gain in splitting the training data per available class label (Lines 4-5).
The information gain for each attribute is computed based on Entropy (Equation
4). Once the largest gained attribute is identified then it be assigned as the root
node (Lines 7-8), and the training cases are then clustered based on the splitting
of this root variable. In other words, subsets of the training data are formed
based on the root node’s possible values (line 9). Then, the same building tree
function is invoked to on these subsets repeatedly, and the decision tree
algorithm will keep dividing and clustering the data cases, while leaving
heterogeneous data cases (conquer) out (lines 10-12). Each of the output tree’s
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nodes represents the features needing classification, while the values of the
features are represented by the branches. Once the initial tree is built and the
algorithm terminates the training phase (lines 1-12) the algorithm invokes a
pruning procedure that prunes unnecessary branches in the tree without
hindering the overall tree forecasted accuracy.

Input: Training dataset (T) and Tree { }
Output: Classifier with rules CL
Build_Tree (T)
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

If T has one class
stop
End if
For each variable v
Do
calculate the information gain from splitting on v
End for
v_Max = The variable with the largest calculated
information gain
8) Tree = v_Max is added as a root node
9) Tv = subsets of T that includes v_Max
10) For each example in Tv Do
11) Treev= build_Tree (Tv)
12) Tree Treev
13) Pruning function
14) Predict test cases
15) End for
Figure 3.2. Build_Tree algorithm for constructing a classification model

(3)
(4)
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where Pc = Probability that T belongs to class l, Tf = Subset of T for which feature
F has value fa. , |Tf| = Number of examples in Tf, and |T| = Size of T.
Once the tree reaches a point where it cannot grow further, the building
process will stop. One potential condition for termination involves growing the
node continuously until every data instance is connected to the same class, or that
similar values are shared by the data instances. The algorithm deals with many
issues. The nominal and continual variables are handled by the classification
algorithm, which means it is effective for noise tolerance. The algorithm also deals
with the missing values and considers them important, and thus they can be
estimated using probabilistic weights. For a specific variable (feature) with a
missing value, each of its branches is given a weight based on its corresponding
estimated probability after splitting that variable. For instance, if we have one
variable “Gender” which has two possible classes in a problem (Yes, No) with
missing values. If, through branching Gender, we have 100 instances - 70
associated with Female and 30 associated with Male, the weights assigned to the
classes for this variable are 70/100 and 30/100. Now, when we get a data example
without gender (missing value), this can be estimated at being weighted 70%
(female) and 30% (male). This enables us to allocate more than one class with this
data example, i.e. Yes and NO with weights 0.7 and 0.3 respectively.
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The classification algorithm deals with overfitting by preventing the tree
from growing once it reaches a certain point; to prune redundant partial trees
does not contribute to overall predictive performance. The algorithm employs
sub-tree replacement by replacing these unnecessary nodes with leaves. A postpruning procedure involves testing pairs of nodes with the common parent to
verify whether joining them together would possibly improve the Entropy by
less than a predetermined value. If so, the leaves are merged into a single node
with all possible outcomes. Equations 5 and 6 give more insight about sub-tree
pruning.
(5)

where Nv is the number of training cases at node v and N v,c is the number of
training cases belonging to the largest frequency class at node v. The error rate at
sub-tree T is calculated as

(6)

After constructing the decision tree out of the training dataset, every path
from the root node to the leaf of the tree will then be converted into If-Then
classification rules. There are three reasons for this conversion:
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1) The classification system will be easy to understand, making the rules
manageable to allow network administrators to comprehend how BHP
flooding attacks work, as well as the possible issues arising.
2) Data priority and blocking policies will be developed as a result of
determining the sending behaviour of the edge nodes during the primary
stages.
3) Overlapping and redundancy within the rules can be identified by the
network administrator, allowing processes for rule pruning to be
developed.
For illustration purposes, the process of converting the tree into rules is
explained in Figure 3.3, which represents a simple decision tree for the binary
classification of nodes. In the figure, the nodes are represented as rectangles
while leaves are shown as circles. The root node represents the feature that best
divides the cases, i.e. “10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate”. Classification based on the best
features continues until a parsimonious representation is obtained. In this
example, once “10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate” was chosen, the first branch was based
on values less than or equal to 0.38. This split leads to the second variable, “10Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use”. The variable then splits on values larger than/equal
to 0.80 and values less than 0.80. Each of these splits reaches a leaf node that
denotes the possible class. In Figure 3.3, the tree consists of two variables, the
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class (B, M), and three possible rules. Each of these rules denotes a path from the
root node to the leaf node. Decision trees are useful given their representation for
classification problems, which constitutes a large portion of everyday
applications.

Figure 3.3 Decision tree model example.
The following reasons demonstrate why a decision tree was chosen as a
way to create the models:
1) Decision tree models have been previously used by many researchers to
solve classification problems, i.e. [53, 54], etc. They offer high performance
in terms of classification accuracy and in different application fields.
2) Decision tree models are easy to understand since they can easily
transform into a knowledge base that contains a set of If-Then rules. Recall
then, that each path from the root to the leaf denotes a rule. The novice
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user, or even domain experts, will be more interested in the rationale
behind any predictive decision rather than just the predictive decision
itself. Since the models contain rules that are easy to interpret and
manage, these models can be extremely useful in decision making by endusers when compared with models derived by other ML approaches such
as support vector machines, probabilistic, or neural networks.
3) The availability of decision tree models in ML tools such as R [55] and
WEKA [56] means that researchers do not have to re-develop them, which
saves a significant amount of time.

3.3.5 Prediction of Test Cases
Finally, the proposed classification model will use the established rule sets
to predict the value of each class. We proposed a basic prediction method that
takes into account the first rule that completely matches the test case variables’
values. Alternatively, the algorithm will search for the rule corresponding to all
attribute values inside the test case, in order for the actual test case to be
classified. To accomplish the task of prediction, our prediction method covers the
discovered rules in a top-down fashion and assigns the class of the rule that
matches the test case variables’ values. If there are no rules fully matching the
test case, then the class label of the first partly matching rule will be assigned to
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the test case. If no rules partly match the test case, then the majority class in the
training dataset is given to the test case.

3.4 Experimentation and Results Analysis

3.4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed decision tree
technique on a dataset that consists of a number of simulation runs aiming to
improve the performance of UDP over OBS networks. All of the variables related
to the network’s performance were collected by running the NCTUns simulator
for hundreds of runs on NSFNET topology [32]. One of the advantages of using
NSFNET topology is that we will have the ability to add and simulate any
number of nodes in the OBS network. The second advantage is that we will have
the ability to record all the different cases that might take a place in the normal
scenario where a single and multiple nodes are placed at different location.
Furthermore, we will have the ability to position the attacker at any location,
observe the behavior of the attacker and record its effect on other legitimate
nodes based on its location. Using the NCTUns simulator with the necessary OBS
modules [32], we collect the data used for classification which resemble the real
world OBS network for training purpose. Therefore, for the normal scenario, the
topology used to establish the training dataset in the simulation contains
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fourteen core switches which linked to an ingress or egress (edge routers) and
then linked to a legitimate senders or receivers (Host-PC). As mentioned earlier,
the location of the ingress and egress edge routers are randomly chosen in order
to examine the network’s performance of multiple nodes at different location in
the OBS network. The following strategy has been developed to create the
training dataset.
1) Set the duration of the simulation to 10 minutes and the number of edge
nodes to M.
2) Record the different variables (see Table 3.1 for details).
3) The edge nodes’ bandwidth capacity varied during the simulations in
order to assess different situations. This is done to ensure all possible
cases – normal, contention and congestion are covered.
4) Repeat for N number of the simulations.
Initially, we record the performance of each individual node with only
one sender and one receiver. For each simulation run, the bandwidth of the node
was assigned to 100 Mbps and then incrementally increases to 200 Mbps, 300
Mbps, 400 Mbps, until we reach the maximum bandwidth of the simulator which
is 1000 Mbps. This is in turn to record and observe how much traffic each node
can transmit based on its distance from the receiver when assigned different
bandwidth. Afterwards, we start by randomly adding more senders and
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receivers, increasing the bandwidth of nodes at each simulation run (100 Mbps,
200 Mbps, 300 Mbps ...1000 Mbps) and simultaneously making the nodes
transmit as much packets as it can in one second. This is in order to observe all
the variables related to the node’s performance i.e. (packets drop rate), the
amount of traffic which has been transmitted by each node and also to
distinguish between the normal, contention, and congestion scenarios during the
simulation for each run. On the other hand, for the attacker scenario, we
duplicate the same topology but this time by randomly placing the attacker at
different location. This is for the aim to record the node’s performance and
observe the affect of the attacker on the legitimate node when placed on different
locations.
During the simulations, the network load was adjusted in each simulation
run, featured random (attacker node) and static (legitimate node) traffic for the
number of nodes to assess the classifiers’ effectiveness. In addition, the attacker
node can be located in different places of the topology; hence we randomly place
it at different locations to seek its true performance on the OBS network.
Moreover, although our topology can handle any number of ingress nodes and
any number of attackers, in the experiments we used single, multiple legitimate
ingress nodes and one attacker in each simulation run since we are interested in
testing the classifiers against the BHP flooding attack rather than testing the
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possible congestion in this topology. Every wavelength channel has 1 Gbps of
bandwidth capacity (1 Gbps is the maximum rate allowed by the simulator for
each node) which represent the traffic transmitted by the legitimate sender. Each
WDM link has one control channel for BHPs and two data channels for DBs. The
wavelength conversion capability was not assumed at the core switch.
Table 2.1 shows the simulation parameters for the OBS network
configuration. As for generating the traffic, the UDP traffic was transmitted using
the greedy mode (which transmits the maximum number of packets) with an
average packet size of 1500 bytes and duration of one second for each run. On
the other hand, the attacker’s traffic have been generated using the simulator, but
without pre-setting values. Situations for the edge nodes that (in simulation
runs) would end up in random levels of BHP flood attacks were created. A point
has been made to show scenarios in which there are occupied resources in the
OBS network without utilization with different occupancies. The simulator may
run for several minutes to achieve the result for “one second” depending on the
load assigned.
For the learning process, we used supervised learning approach. This is
since we are aiming to build a predictive model to counter the BHP flooding
attack problem using the data collected from previous performance results of the
edge nodes during a number of simulation runs. Supervised learning involves
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processing datasets to learn the classification models that are then utilized or
used to automatically classify edge nodes during a future simulation run to the
right class. The learning during the data processing phase is often guided toward
a target variable called the class label and hence the model generated only
predicts the target class variable. A common example of supervised learning is
loan approval application in banking which aims to either approve or reject loans
submitted by clients.
Since we are seeking to identify the behaviour of UDP over OBS networks
by predicting the behaving ingress nodes from the misbehaving ones, supervised
learning approach was adopted to accomplish this task. In supervised learning,
an input data with several input variables plus a target class label is needed. The
input data in our case consists of different performance indicators related to the
UDP over OBS networks that have been formed and a target class label (as
previously discussed in section 3.3.3). This data is basically called a training
dataset and it is used as an input to the supervised learning algorithm to
a) Discover useful correlations between the performance indicators and the
class label

b) Construct a classification model (classifier) that can be utilized to forecast
the class label value in test cases
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The supervised learning algorithm utilized to build the predictive model
is based on useful If-Then knowledge base derived by a proposed decision tree
algorithm (Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 gives further details). To test the proposed
classification algorithm and its types of feature selection, the WEKA ML tool was
used [56]. WEKA is an open source Java platform implemented at Waikato
University of New Zealand. The platform features various techniques for data
analysis and can be used to perform a number of tasks including visualization,
predictive and descriptive tasks. Classification, rule association, clustering, time
series, regression and feature selection are some of WEKA’s techniques.
In order to calculate the measure of evaluation during the building of the
predictive models, a ten-fold cross validation evaluation approach was adopted
[37]. In ML testing, this is a popular method as it can help to reduce overfitting
within the training dataset. Overfitting typically occurs when the learning
method over-trains on the input dataset to maximize the predictive performance
of the resulting models. This leads to the serious issue of displaying effective
performance on the training data, but poor performance on any test data, and
thus the models’ performance cannot be generalized, with the models being
rejected. The ten-fold cross validation process works through splitting the
training data set into ten partitions. The classification algorithm is trained on
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nine partitions and then evaluated on the remaining partition. The procedure is
repeated 10 times and accuracies derived at each run are averaged.
All experiments have been conducted using a computing machine with a
2.3 GHz processor. C4.5 decision tree algorithms have been used for data
processing to derive the predictive models for the BHP flooding attacks [46].
Finally, as discussed previously, CHI and CFS WEKA filters were used for
feature selection [52, 57].

3.4.2 Results on the Binary-Class Dataset
After the training dataset has been processed and the features have been
selected, the decision tree algorithm was applied to the binary-class dataset in

10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763
| 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use < 0.8003310674999999: B
| 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use >= 0.8003310674999999: M
10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.395560763
| 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.410186542
| | 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.4060369875
| | | 10-Run-Delay < 5.5215E-4
| | | | 10-Run-Delay < 5.237E-4: M
| | | | 10-Run-Delay >= 5.237E-4: B
| | | 10-Run-Delay >= 5.5215E-4: M
| | 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.4060369875: B
| 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate >= 0.410186542: M
Figure. 3.4. The initial binary classification model.
order to generate a predictive model for classifying the edge nodes into the
appropriate categories. Two categories, the Behaving node (B) and Misbehaving
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node (M) were featured in the primary dataset. The primary predictive model
(featuring three variables and the class) can be seen in Figure 3.4.
The classification model’s effectiveness is typically measured using either
the classification accuracy or the error rate, which can be seen in equations 7 and
8. Using these metrics, the test data is allocated a predicted class by the model.
When the test data class results are similar to a models’ predicted class, a correct
classification is recorded. Otherwise, a misclassification is counted. For test data
with N data instances, the classification accuracy denotes the proportion of the
correctly classified data instances from N, whereas the error rate is the
proportion of misclassified data instances from N. A 93% accuracy of the binary
decision tree model was recorded, meaning that centred on the nodes behaviour
dataset, it could correctly assign almost 93% of the data instances into the correct
categories, misclassifying 16 instances. The reason why many of the
misclassifications occurred was due to a behaving/misbehaving overlap in the
dropping packet average rate. More specifically, an average packet dropping rate
of between 32% - 40% was observed in 75% of the misclassified instances. The
rest of the misclassified instances resulted from exceptional cases, such as when
there was a high dropping rate caused by congestion rather than BHP flood
attacks. It can also be due to uncertain behaviours in sending packets from the
edge nodes, including packet delays or bandwidth usage.
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The binary classification model produced from the network dataset
contains three features. These features helped in the generation of several
automated rules that have been extracted from the tree model. After rulepruning, these rules are described as follows:
1) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763 AND 10-Run-AVG-BandwidthUse< 0.8003310674999999
THEN Class = B (205 cases classified correctly and 6 cases incorrectly)
2) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate < 0.395560763 AND 10-Run-AVG-BandwidthUse >0.8003310674999999
THEN Class = M (2 cases classified correctly and 1 case incorrectly)
3) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.395 & 0.41) AND 10-Run-Delay is
between (5.5215E-4 and 5.237 E-4) THEN Class = B (2 cases classified
correctly and 2 cases incorrectly)
4) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.395 & 0.41) AND 10-Run-Delay >
5.237 E-4)
THEN Class = M (22 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly)
5) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate is between (0.4060 & 0.4101)
THEN Class = M (4 cases classified correctly and 0 case incorrectly)
6) IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.41
THEN Class = M (147 cases classified correctly and 4 cases incorrectly)
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The above shows that rules 5 and 6 can be combined into one rule
showing that “IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.41 Then Class= M Otherwise Class=
B.” However, the number of errors when merging this rule increases from four
misclassified instances to 10. To remove noisy feature-class correlations, pruning
was used to improve the initial decision tree, which produced the following
important rules:


IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.395522 Then Class = B (214 cases classified
correctly and 6 cases incorrectly)



IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.395522 Then Class = M (184 cases classified
correctly and 10 cases incorrectly)
Just 16 misclassifications occurred within the above rules, equating to a

4.27% error rate using just one feature: 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate. While the
classification accuracy has been improved using two basic rules from the
decision tree algorithm, the first rule of the initial model has not led to a loss of
knowledge. Using decision trees and other ML predictive models can help endusers by providing edge nodes with a binary classification, uncovering
otherwise-hidden knowledge. This gained knowledge can help automate the
classification of edge nodes as well as assisting the Network Administrators and
other domain experts to determine the performance of edge nodes themselves.
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3.4.3 Results on the Multi-Class Dataset
Next, a more comprehensive model that contained multiple categories is
introduced to better reflect the reality of the BHP flood attacks. Following the
processing of the training dataset and selection of the features, the decision tree
algorithm was applied to the multi-class dataset in order to provide the
predictive model for classifying the edge nodes into their correct categories. Four
categories, the Misbehaving-Block (Block), Behaving-No Block (No Block),
Misbehaving-No Block (M-No Block), and Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait) were
featured in the new dataset.
The decision tree-rule method was applied for data processing in the new
multi-class dataset, and seven rules emerged. These rules are displayed as
follows:
1. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.4 Then No Block
(225 cases classified correctly and 0 cases incorrectly)
2. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.509 AND 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <=
0.416 Then M-No Block
(33 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly)
3. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.515 Then Block
(58 cases classified correctly and 22 cases incorrectly)
4. IF 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use <= 0.53 Then M-No Block
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(47 cases classified correctly and 9 cases incorrectly)
5. IF 10-Run-Delay > 0.0009 Then M-No Block
(17 cases classified correctly and 2 cases incorrectly)
6. IF 10-Run-Delay <= 0.0007 AND 10-Run-Delay <= 0.0006 AND 10-RunAVG-Bandwidth-Use > 0.545 Then M-No Block
(8 cases classified correctly and 3 cases incorrectly)
7. Otherwise M-Wait (10 cases classified correctly and 4 cases incorrectly)
From the new multi-class model, the packet drop rate variable remains the
most critical for preventing BHP flooding attacks, as it appears in the tree
model’s first three rules. There is no error rate within the first rule while it also
encompasses a spread of data instances (i.e. 225), signifying a strong rule when
trying to identify behaving and misbehaving edge nodes, which can then be
separated further to isolate the edge nodes which may be leading to BHP
flooding attacks. Meanwhile, the next rule identified 33 instances correctly versus
3 incorrect ones. Again, this is a significant rule which showed that data was still
able to be transmitted, despite the misbehaving edge nodes and therefore was a
reliable QoS indicator in terms of the average packet drop rate variable of the
nodes. It is clear in the third rule that as the average packet drop rate goes above
51.5% in misbehaving nodes, it shows signs of reserving unused resources as a
result of the BHP flood attacks causing the large part of the packet dropping.
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This node therefore will be prevented from sending further data. The remaining
rules generated in the model (rules 4-7) are useful since two additional variables
have been used: average bandwidth used and delay per second. However, these
rules are associated with larger error rates and cover a limited number of data
instances. For example, the last two rules only cover 25 instances, 7 of which are
misclassified.
The main feature contributing to BHP flooding attacks remains the 10Run-AVG-Drop-Rate with 10-Run-AVG-Bandwidth-Use and 10-Run-Delay
following next. The multi-class models had a fair predictive accuracy of 83.66%.
Interestingly, the accuracy increases to nearly 87% if the pruning method is used.
Moreover, the number of rules shrinks to just three rules in the set, which can be
seen in Figure 3.5. Just one variable is used within the newly pruned model: 10Run-AVG-Drop-Rate. According to Figure 3.5, 225 instances are accurately
covered by the first rule, making it appear as an effectively predictive rule. There
were 23 misclassified instances in the second rule out of a total of 135, while the
highest error rate versus lowest data coverage was found in the third rule.
1. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.4 Then No Block (225.0)
2. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.4
AND 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate <= 0.509 Then M-No Block (112.0/23.0)
3. IF 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.4
AND 10-Run-AVG-Drop-Rate > 0.509: Block (61.0/24.0)
Figure 3.5. The multi-class classification model with pruning
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To better visualize the performance of the algorithm, confusion matrix
(Table 3.6), also known as error matrix, is used [58]. Figure 3.6 shows a decision
tree model confusion matrix derived from the multi-class dataset. It examines
both the predicted and accurate class values from the classification as shown in
Table 3.6, where the different rows represent the actual class instances and the
predicted classes are presented in the columns [58]. The performance of the
classification model is usually measured using either the error rate (Equation 7)
or the classification accuracy (Equations 8).
Table 3.6
Confusion matrix for classification task in ML

Actual
Class

Predicted Class
YES

NO

YES

True Positive (TP)

False Negative (FN)

NO

False Positive (FP)

True Negative (TN)

(7)
(8)

Where TP (True Positive) represents data instances that were predicted
“Yes” and their actual class is “Yes”, the FP (False Positive) represents the data
instances that are incorrectly predicted “Yes” and their actual class is “No,” FN
(False Negative) denotes data instances that incorrectly predicted as “No” but
have actual class “Yes,” and TN (True Negative) denotes data instances that are
correctly predicted “No” and their actual class is “No.
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Figure 3.6 shows that the behaving edge nodes have been identified by the
decision tree method without any errors (224 instances have been correctly
predicted “No Block,” and they are behaving edge nodes). The misbehaving
edge nodes were the ones which posed a problem. More specifically, 24 of the
113 actual misbehaving nodes (not at BHP flood attack levels) were blocked.
Meanwhile, 21 of the 51 instances were identified as misbehaving, but were not
blocked and instead were predicted as “M-No Block”. An explanation for the
misclassifications could be due to the high packet drop rates, but not at a
significant level for them to be blocked. This means that in some iterations, the
edge nodes will have reserved network resources, leaving the other portion of
resources unused as a result of the BHP flooding attack.
a
224
0
0
0

b
1
89
21
9

c
0
24
30
0

d <-- classified as
0 | a = No Block
0 | b = M-No Block
0 | c = Block
0 | d = M-Wait

Figure 3.6. The confusion matrix of the decision tree model derived from
the multi-class dataset
Another notable result in the confusion matrix is that all of the data
instances that should belong to class “M-Wait”, have been misclassified to class
“M-No Block”. This is due to two reasons. The first reason is that a node gets
classified as M-Wait only if there is a competition on reserving the resources
between two or more nodes that have high drop rates but not to the point of
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blocking. In such case, the node with higher drop rate has to wait since it has
less priority due to its misbehaviour. In the experiments, we minimized these
scenarios having two data channels in the simulator setting since we are more
interested in the other three sub-class labels; more specifically, the blocking. The
second reason is the overlapping data between the two sub-class labels (M-No
Block and M-Wait). While misbehaving behaviour is present within both subclass labels and very likely has a high drop rate, the rate is not high enough to
ensure that the instances are blocked. In this instance therefore, the decision tree
failed to identify 9 challenging data instances, and instead misclassified them
into a class which had some similar data instances. To overcome this issue, more
simulation runs can be performed to have larger data representations for subclass labels M-Wait in order to allow the learning algorithm to differentiate
among the sub-class labels in the resulting tree models.
It is clear from the confusion matrix that the misbehaving edge nodes are
the most difficult cases to predict. As a matter of fact, the false positives and true
negatives presented in the confusion matrix by the decision tree method proves
that the models derived are not overfitted. This is because during the simulation
run, random levels of reserving network resources by the sending nodes were
ensured. By separating the misbehaving class into three possible sub-class labels,
the reality of the BHP flooding attack issue is exposed, creating errors as well as
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providing more specific classification for the edge nodes. Transmitting data
through automatic classification is a key method for ensuring better quality of
service (QoS) through reserving resources.

3.5 Related Studies
In recent years, researchers have been drawn to the significant issue of
data flow management within computer networks. The problem rested in the
inability of packet headers to hold enough information to enable automatic
classification, leading to a low accuracy in labelling traffic flow. Previous studies
[38, 39] have employed ML methods in order to classify packets and flow within
the Internet. Meanwhile, few related studies have used ML techniques within
OBS networks [40, 50].
In [40], the authors differentiated between contention and congestion
problems in OBS networks by classifying data burst losses. The authors
developed a measure called the ‘number of bursts between failures’ (NBBF),
which is designed to accurately identify the types of losses. The method applied
both expectation maximisation (EM) algorithm [59] and Hidden Markov Chain
(HMC) [60] to a sample of data gathered from burst losses. More specifically, the
NBBF at egress nodes between two lost bursts is recorded so that the losses can
be categorized, followed by the use of a HMM classification algorithm in order to
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identify the kind of loss. The studies carried out show that this hybrid ML
approach can single out both congestion and contention losses.
The authors of [50] employed a new form of routing mechanism for JETbased OBS networks called ‘graphical probabilistic routing model’, which
identifies less commonly-used links on a hop-by-hop basis through adopting a
Bayesian network [61]. The algorithm uses neither FDL nor wavelength
converters at the OBS’ core switch. The simulation results of the study show that
the adaptive routing algorithm suggested is more effective at reducing the Burst
Loss Ratio (BLR) in comparison to more fixed methods.
The authors of [35] proposed one of the earliest uses of ML in order to
classify Internet data traffic. They used a Naïve Bayes probabilistic method of
classification [48]. The early training dataset was built using various traffic flow
identifiers such as flow length, port ID, the time elapsed between two
consecutive flows as well as other identifiers. Traffic flow was manually assigned
by a domain expert while the dataset was prepared. Next, the training dataset
underwent the Naïve Bayes algorithm in order to produce a system of
classification which would be able to instinctively predict approaching traffic
flows. Large volumes of data were tested and displayed a 65% accuracy rate
using the Naïve Bayes method, rising to 95% after some adjustments to the
dataset, such as the use of feature selection.
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The authors of [39] examined the issue of data traffic in order to
strengthen network resource management, doing so through permitting the
network manager to recognize different data traffic types. More specifically, the
authors aimed to determine a key issue in relation to network performance in
terms of source, destination, traffic quantities and so on, with recommended
actions that the network manager should take. The study involved the collection
of data traffic features including byte counts, connection duration, packet size,
interarrival statistics amongst as well as others. Next, they applied the EM
clustering algorithm to the dataset in order to cluster the traffic flows into a set of
groups. The results recorded demonstrated that six key clusters, based on single
and bulk transactions, could distinguish between the traffic flows to allow more
in depth flow examination. They did not provide information on the
categorization of the data flows following the clustering process.
In [41], the authors surveyed the various ML approaches which had been
used between 2004 and 2007 to classify and manage IP traffic within different
forms of computer networks. They based their research around the existing ML
classification methodology, feature selection, model evaluation and type
learning. Both supervised and unsupervised learning approaches were examined
using them to complete traffic flow classification across various typical computer
networks. They examined unsupervised learning using clustering as well as
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other tested approaches including EM and K-Means. Methods discussed for
supervised learning included probabilistic (Naïve Bayes), K-Nearest Neighbour
(KNN) [62], and Genetic Algorithm (GA) [63]. Finally, they examined the various
evaluation approaches employed in order to judge whether or not the ML
approaches were effective.
The ML-based academic studies discussed above have centred on data
traffic identification, whereas this study is concerned with a completely different
issue – BHP flooding attack. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first
to offer proposals and to develop a decision tree method of classification to
provide a solution to the issue of BHP flooding attack in OBS networks. Since
previous studies have not used ML as a way to block misbehaving edge nodes
which send DBs in OBS networks, we believe a solution is needed in order to
address this critical issue in the initial phases of BHP flooding attacks.
3.6 Summary
Although serving as one of the most promising optical switching
technology for optical networks, OBS network is a technology that has not
matured enough for it to be implemented and deployed. The basic idea of OBS
relies mainly on the concept of sending BHP in advance to reserve the resources
as well as setting the path for the packets that are aggregated into data bursts at
the edge nodes. Compromising an edge node by an attacker and sending BHPs
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in large volumes without sending corresponding data bursts can lead to a serious
security issue called BHP flooding attack. Network performance as well as QoS
can be severely affected by BHP flooding attacks, which is why it is important to
develop new classification strategies for identifying edge nodes with
misbehaving sending behaviours at the initial stages.
This research proposes to use ML to develop a new architecture based on
decision tree that will accurately and effectively classify edge nodes of OBS
networks using straightforward If-Then rules. These rules are discovered from
real data related to multiple performance indicators (variables) recorded by a
simulator. Initially, the proposed rules are able to classify the sending nodes into
Behaving and Misbehaving with 93% accuracy. The models that are more
realistic are then produced after dividing the Misbehaving class into four subclass labels in order to further classify this type of node based on data priority.
Experimentations using multiple edge nodes on a large dataset collected from a
number of simulation runs revealed that the rules generated by the classification
algorithm are highly effective in preventing misbehaving nodes from sending
data, and therefore able to counter the BHP flooding attack problem. More
specifically, the tree models generated from the binary dataset were able to
classify edge nodes with 93% accuracy. In addition, the modified decision tree
models for the misbehaving nodes (multi-class dataset), had an 87% accuracy
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when splitting the Misbehaving class into four sub-class labels: MisbehavingBlock (Block), Behaving-No Block (No Block), Misbehaving-No Block (M-No
Block), and Misbehaving-Wait (M-Wait). This breakdown meant that we could
develop a fine-grained strategy for data priority for the edge nodes using the
information gathered from the classification models. In the near future, we
intend do an experimental study to evaluate several ML algorithms in order to
seek the one which has the best performance for the BHP flooding attack
problem. Also, we hope to further improve the classification architecture through
being able to add further volumes of nodes, while also building the new learning
algorithm into the simulator.
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CHAPTER 4
DETECTING BHP-FLOODING ATTACK IN OBS NETWORK: A MACHINE
LEARNING PROSPECTIVE
4.1 Background
An optical network (ON) is a known medium for data transmission,
adopting an Optical Burst Switching (OBS) network for the Internet [64]. In an
OBS network, burst header packets (BHPs) are transmitted in advance to allocate
enough resources prior to sending the actual data bursts (DBs), ensuring network
management and Quality of Service (QoS). This enables attackers to flood the
network with malicious BHPs, reserving the network resources without proper
use. In this case, malicious BHPs continue to reserve the network resources
without sending the actual DBs, hindering the performance of the OBS network,
in some cases causing Denial of Service (DoS) [65]. Therefore, it is essential to
prevent BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks by blocking misbehaving ingress
nodes that continuously transmit malicious BHPs, and preventing the legitimate
BHPs from reserving the required resources at the intermediate core switch.
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Limited research works detecting BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks
exist, e.g. [9, 10, 65]. In [9], a data flow classification architecture was
implemented at the optical layer to combat BHP flooding attacks. This method
distinguishes between the offset time inside the BHP and the recorded delay
between this BHP and its related DB. [10] utilized optical code words to single
out malicious BHPs sent by ingress nodes in an OBS network. The authors used
statistical data analysis related to packets sent and dropped to detect
the possibility of BHP flooding attacks. [65] developed a new security model to
be implemented into the OBS core switch to prevent BHP flooding attacks.
The countermeasure security model can detect malicious ingress nodes based on
their behavior, alongside the amount of reserved resources that are not being
utilized, and block any malicious ingress nodes until the threat ceases. The
reported results using the NCTUns network simulator showed that the security
method of [65] was able to effectively differentiate among legitimate and
malicious ingress nodes, thus maintaining good network performance.
Despite the few recent studies on BHP flooding attacks, the detection rate
is still low. Further, the entire process relies on the domain experts’ knowledge
and experience. Therefore, there is a need for a more efficient detection system
that can engage the core switch in OBS network, thus identifying misbehaving
ingress nodes in an automated manner as early as possible. One promising
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approach to accomplish this is the Machine Learning (ML) method. This uses the
historical performance of source nodes during data transmission to construct
classification models known as classifiers. The classifiers then predict whether
the source nodes are sending legitimate BHPs or not, and filter out malicious
BHPs that might cause flooding attacks. The outcomes of the ML method will
enable security administrators to quickly block misbehaving ingress nodes until
they change their behaviors. (It is the firm belief of the authors) that classifying
ingress nodes using ML to counter BHP flooding attacks is yet to be studied
within an OBS network.
This study examines the performance of ML methods to counter the risks
associated with BHP flood attacks in OBS networks. The problem studied is a
typical predictive task in classification, in which different variables linked with
ingress nodes’ performances are collected whilst sending BHPs (in simulation
runs), and are saved in a training dataset. Examples of variables are not limited
to iteration number, but can include the sending node label, packets sent, packets
dropped, delay time, and so on. More details on the complete dataset of variables
can be found at [66], and are briefly explained in Section 4.3. The ML role
involves processing the different variables in the dataset to obtain concealed
information useful for prediction (classifier). This classifier is then used to
categorize ingress nodes in certain future scenarios as accurately as possible,
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improving the manual classification which indeed requires care, time and
experience.
The ultimate aim of this study is to examine the applicability of ML to the
problem of BHP flooding attacks in OBS networks. To achieve this, we
extensively investigated various ML techniques that adopt different learning
approaches to the research problem considered. We seek to identify the most
relevant ML technique(s) for solving the issue of BHP flooding attacks, in
addition to revealing the reasons behind the relevancy. Thus, we endeavor to
answer the following research questions:
 Can ML be used as a BHP detection approach in an OBS network?
 Which ML techniques improve detection rate and time performance?
 Which ML technique is more suitable to end-users, and why?
The ML approaches considered in this study are Logistic Regression,
Naïve Bayes, RIDOR, SVM-SMO, NN-MultilayerPerceptron, C4.5, AdaBoost,
and Bagging [45, 48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. The diversity of the ML approaches
strengthens the confidence in the results, hence our recommendations (see
Sections 4.3, 4.4 & 4.6). The performance of the wide range of ML techniques has
been measured using different metrics, against a published dataset at UCI
(University of California-Irvine) repository [73]. Specifically, we utilized
classification accuracy, classifiers’ construction time in milliseconds (ms),
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precision, recall, and the harmonic mean among other measures (Section 4.3 &
4.4 give further details) [74].

4.2 The Considered Machine Learning Techniques
Since the BHP flooding attack is a typical prediction problem,
classification methods in ML seems appropriate to identify malicious and
legitimate edge nodes. In classification problems, a model called the classifier is
constructed from historical labelled dataset(s). The learned classifier is then
employed to forecast the class label in datasets that are unlabeled, known as test
datasets [43, 75]. The quality of the classifiers extracted by ML methods rely
primarily on the classification accuracy, as well as other known evaluation
metrics such as recall, precision, and harmonic mean [38]. In addition, classifiers
formed after data processing differ based on the ML techniques used. For
instance, rule induction classifiers contain rules, and Naïve Bayes classifiers hold
just class memberships in a probability format [76]. In this section, we highlight
eight different ML techniques that generate different type of classifiers.
Specifically, we investigate classifiers extracted by Logistic Regression,
Probabilistic-Naïve Bayes, Rule Induction- RIDOR, Support Vector Machine Sequential

Minimal

Optimization

(SVM-SMO),

Neural

Network-NN-

MultilayerPerceptron, Decision Tree-C4.5, Boosting-AdaBoost, and Bagging [45,
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48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. The choices of these techniques are mainly based on the
following facts:
1) Different learning methodologies are employed for data processing
2) Different classifier formats are presented to the end-user
3) Applicability and usage in previous domains in particular computer
networks, computer security among others, i.e. [43, 75, 77, 47, 78, 79].
Steps of machine learning are shown in Figure 4.1, and are briefly explained
below.
1) Data pre-processing (Optional): In this step, any noise related to the training
dataset, such as missing values, duplications, and feature selection are
completed. The output of this step is a processed dataset.
2) Training: In this step, the ML technique processes the data for knowledge or
patterns. In classification techniques, the classifier is constructed in this
step.
3) Evaluation: The classifier is evaluated on a test dataset to measure its
effectiveness. This step results in different evaluation metrics.
4) Pattern Visualization (Optional): In this step, the outcomes as well as its
quality measures are presented to the end-user in a non-technical manner
to ease decision making.
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The next section briefly summarizes known ML learning approaches that
this study investigates to be utilized in solving the BHP flood attacks problem.

Figure 4.1. Steps of ML classification technique
4.2.1

Rule Induction - RIDOR
Rule induction is a classification approach that normally extracts If-Then

rules in a sequential fashion [76]. Typically, a rule induction technique divides
the input dataset into splits according to the available class values. Then, for each
class split, the induction technique learns and derives If-Then rules based on
mathematical metrics, such as a rule’s expected accuracy (Equation (9)). Data
examples in a split, for instance A, are positive examples for the class of A, and
are considered negative examples for the other class labels in the other data
splits. For a data split, the induction technique builds an empty rule, and then
adds items to the rule’s antecedent (left hand side/body) until the rule meets a
termination condition. When this occurs, the rule is generated, and all data
examples that the rule classifies are discarded. Then, the induction technique
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learns the next rule from the same split until the data split becomes empty.
Following this, the induction technique moves to the next data split until all data
splits become empty, or no more rules with acceptable accuracies can be
discovered [78]. Common rule induction techniques are RIDOR [67] and RIPPER
[80].
RIDOR, for example, derives a default rule class, and then learns all the
exceptions for that default rule using Incremental Reduced Error Pruning (IREP)
[81], a learning method. An exception is a rule able to forecast the class label
other than the default class. IREP eliminated one exhausting phase of an earlier
rule induction technique called Reduced Error Pruning (REP), saving substantial
training time. In RIDOR, the training dataset is divided into pruning (1/3) and
growing (2/3) subsets. Then, RIDOR builds incremental rules one at a time. When
a rule is about to be evaluated for possible pruning, its training data examples in
the pruning and growing subsets are removed, and the rule gets extracted.
During pruning, RIDOR considers deleting items from the rule’s body and
terminates the pruning phase when removing an item from a rule cannot
improve the rule’s accuracy.
(9)
where P = the # of positive instances covered by a rule r (both antecedent and
consequent)
88

T= the total # of instances covered by r’s antecedent

4.2.2

Decision Tree Rules – C4.5
C4.5 [70] is a decision technique utilizing Entropy and Information Gain

(IG) (Equations 10-11 below) to construct tree based classifiers for prediction. To
build a classifier, initially, the IGs for all variables in the training dataset, other
than the class variable, are computed, and a root with the highest IG is selected.
The IG is calculated based on how informative a data variable is in dividing the
examples in the training dataset with respect to the class label. When a root is
chosen, the algorithm excludes it in the next iteration and repeatedly calculates
the IGs for the other available variables, until the tree cannot be built any further
or the remaining data examples are linked with just a single class. In the formed
decision tree, a path from the root node to any leaf denotes a rule, and the leaf
denotes a decision (class label).
(10)
(11)
where Pc = Probability that T belongs to class l, Tf = Subset of T for which feature
F has value fa. , |Tf| = Number of examples in Tf, and |T| = Size of T.
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4.2.3

Probabilistic Methods- Naive Bayes
In classification, when a test example requires a class label, an efficient

way to classify the test example is to use NB technique, which is based on Bayes
theorem. NB calculates the probability of the test example with respect to each
class label using prior knowledge of the test example’s variables, and their
appearances with each class in the training dataset. The frequency of each
variable and the class in the training dataset is obtained in addition to the
frequency of each class label. Then, all probabilities are multiplied by each other
and the test data example is given the class with the highest probability score
(Equation 12 below). NB predicates independent assumptions for variables and
the class, which is not necessarily true in real application data [82]. Nevertheless,
this probabilistic technique is highly efficient in deriving classifiers in contrast to
other ML techniques [83].
Given a test data example as a vector A = (a1, a2, …, am) where each a is a
variable, using NB, the conditional probability can be obtained as:
(12)
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4.2.4

Boosting and Bagging
Bagging and Boosting learning approaches use the training dataset in

multiple trails to produce numbers of weak classifiers, that are then merged to
form a global classifier [84]. The idea is to utilize both the weak and the strong
classifiers in predicting the class label of test data.
In Boosting, a weak classifier is simply built from the input dataset, and
then utilized to assign class labels to the training data examples. The next weak
classifier is built from the training data, and training examples that have not been
correctly classified by the previous weak classifier are selected more often to be
re-classified by the current weak classifier, improving the model’s predictive
accuracy. The below steps clarify how Boosting algorithms, such as AdaBoost
[71, 85], work:
1) Select a base ML algorithm for learning such as a rule based classifier
2) The base algorithm learns a weak classifier from the training dataset and
assigns an equal weight for each training data example
3) When there are misclassification cases (incorrectly classified data
examples), we re-apply the base ML algorithm, and pay more attention to
the unclassified data examples to improve the predictive performance
4) Repeat steps 2-3 until the intended accuracy has been derived
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5) Merge the weak classifiers to produce a strong classifier
6) When a test data needs to be classified, use a voting mechanism to assign
the class label from the strong classifier and the weak classifiers.
In the Bagging classification approach [72], sample data examples are
generated for each trail (iteration) from the original training dataset (often with
the same size of the original training dataset). Then, a base ML algorithm is used
to generate a classifier from the sample, and the process is repeated a number of
times. Finally, all derived classifiers are aggregated together to form a global
(strong) classifier. When test data is about to be classified in the Bagging
approach, the class is assigned based on a voting mechanism using both the
global and weak classifiers, similar to the Boosting approach. The difference
between Bagging and Boosting approaches is that in Bagging, when the data
sample is produced from the training dataset, the resembling process is not
reliant on the performance of any previously derived classifiers, as it is in
Boosting.

4.2.5

ANN
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) consists of interconnected neurons

that transform a set of input examples into desired output (class) without having
to reveal the transformation details [47]. The ANN advantage comes from
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choosing the right numbers of the hidden neurons, and the results often rely on
the input variables features and weights associated with their interconnections.
Nevertheless, determining the numbers of hidden neurons and other important
thresholds prior to data processing is fundamental to the quality of the outcome
in ANN algorithms. Questions such as, what is the right number of hidden
layers, epoch size, and acceptable learning rate, among others, need to be set by a
domain expert in order to generate fair and acceptable classifiers. Overall,
researchers still utilize train-and-error methods to tune the aforementioned
parameters since there is no clear methodology for setting these up [86]. ANNs
utilize sigmoid functions during constructing classifiers, in which weights are
repeatedly amended to come up with the desired error rate that the domain
expert had set prior to the beginning of the learning phase.

4.2.6

SVM
SVM is a classification approach proposed to enhance the predictive

performance of classic classification techniques [87]. This approach depends on
hyperplanes, which divide data examples based on class memberships. The SVM
learning mechanism sorts data examples using mathematical functions known as
kernels. A kernel computes the similarity of data examples using the available
classes in the training dataset [88]. Often, kernels are determined by SVM
experts, and then utilized for the classification phase.
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SMO trains SVM on a large quadratic programming (QP) optimization
problem [68]. SMO decomposes the QP problem into a number of smaller
problems, and then solves them by avoiding a numerical QP inner loop. The
computing resource needed in the particular memory for SMO is linear in the
training dataset size, which permits the SMO algorithm to process larger input
datasets. Reported experimental results revealed that SVM algorithms such as
SMO generate high predictive classification systems in multiple domains,
especially text categorization rather than probabilistic, and induction [87, 89].

4.2.7

Logistic Regression
When the target variable in classification dataset is continuous, (numeric)

classic ML methods such as rule induction, decision trees, and covering are not
able to produce a classifier. Linear regression can solve such a problem by
offering methods describing the training dataset in the context of a predictive
task, by revealing the relationships between independent variables and the class
variable (dependent). Unlike linear regression, in Logistic regression, the class
variable is not continuous, but is rather categorical (predefined possible values)
[45, 90].
Logistic regression is formulated based on Equation 5 below:
(13)
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where p = probability of Y = 1
e = base of the natural logarithm (around 2.718)
a and b = inputs parameters of the logistic model
Due to the curvilinear correlation between p and X, b in (Equation 13) is
different than b in a typical linear regression model. We can linearize the logistic
regression model by converting the dependent variable from a likelihood
(probability) to a logit, as shown in Equation 14.
(14)

= logit (log odds) of Y = 1

(15)

where
a and b = inputs of the logistic model
The logit (Equation 15) is often named a link function, because it gives a
linear conversion of the logistic regression model.

4.3

Experimental Setting and Data
This section investigates the ML algorithm’s performance on a simulated

dataset generated by the NCTUns simulator for over a thousand runs on
NSFNET topology [32]. The aim is to enhance the performance of UDP on OBS
networks by automatically detecting misbehaving ingress nodes that may cause
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BHP flood attacks, helping to manage the network’s resources. By employing
NSFNET topology, we can insert and simulate with any number of nodes, in
order to investigate different scenarios. The simulation parameters for the OBS
network configuration are displayed in Table 2.1. The simulator may need to run
for 15 to 45 minutes to obtain the result for just “one second” depending on the
load assigned.
All experiments have been conducted utilizing a recently developed
simulated dataset that belongs to the authors. This can be obtained from the UCI
Machine Learning Repository (University of California-Irvine) dataset [73]. This
contains twenty-two variables related to flooding attacks, including the class
variable. The variables collected during the NCTUns simulator directly associate
with the OBS network’s performance. The dataset size consists of 1075 examples,
and each example denotes one iteration (a simulation run) in which an ingress
node is sending data over the OBS network. Different scenarios, including BHP
flood attacks without pre-setting values, have been generated during the
simulation, ensuring that ingress nodes have random levels of BHP flood attacks.
This is essential to show situations of occupied network resources without
proper utilization and with different occupancies. During the simulated runs,
two ingress nodes were used. In addition, for each simulation run, the
bandwidth of the node was initially assigned to 100 Mbps, and then
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incrementally increased to 200 Mbps, 300 Mbps, 400 Mbps, and so forth, until the
maximum bandwidth, i.e. 1000 Mbps, is reached.
For illustration purposes, Table 4.1 depicts eight variables with five
iterations exhibiting how the ingress nodes for every simulation run were used
to transmit data. The table displays iterations that demonstrated behaving and
misbehaving edge nodes. The dataset contains four possible class labels (Block,
No Block, Misbehaving-No-Block, Misbehaving-Wait), and thus the problem is a
Table 4.1
Sample of five iterations of the processed multi-class training dataset

multi-class classification. In Table 4.1, at iteration #1, ingress node 3 was
permitted to send data, since it was classified as a behaving node. Ingress node 9,
associated with a low BHP flooding rate, was slightly misbehaving, yet because
of its low packet dropping rate, it was not blocked. However, at iteration #5,
ingress node 3 was blocked, since this node was causing high BHP flooding, its
BHPs reserving bandwidth without utilization. At the same iteration, despite
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node 9 misbehaving, it was still permitted to send data (misbehaving but no
block). A trickier scenario is illustrated at iteration #4, in which both ingress
nodes are misbehaving, yet are not reaching a BHP flooding attack. Therefore,
node 3, due to its higher BHP flood rate, delays until node 9 transmits its data.
The Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA) tool was
adopted to process the dataset using ML [56]. This tool is a Java-based open
source, containing various methods related to ML, data mining, visulization,
data filtering, and variable selection among others. For all considered ML
algorithms, a 10-fold cross validation (10 fold-CV) method was employed during
the training phase [56]. 10 fold-CV is a common testing method in ML that
ensures the input dataset splits into 10 folds. The algorithm is then trained on 9
folds, and evaluated against the remaining fold to generate the error rate. This
procedure is repeated ten times, and all error rates are averaged to show the
overall performance of the learning algorithm. The machine used to run all
experiments is Intel® Xeon with 3.72 GHz 2 processors.
A number of ML algorithms have been selected to counter the risk of BHP
flood attacks by detecting misbehaving ingress nodes. In particular, Simple
Logistic

Regression,

Naïve

Bayes,

RIDOR,

SVM-Sequential

Minimal

Optimization (SVM-SMO), NN-MultilayerPerceptron, C4.5, AdaBoost, and
Bagging [45, 48, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72]. We would like to evaluate the classification
98

systems’ predictive accuracies derived from the aforementioned ML algorithms
on the BHP flood attack problem. The main metrics used in the ML algorithms’
comparisons are:
1) Classification accuracy in %
2) True Positives (TPs) and False Positives (FPs)
3) Precision, Recall and Harmonic Mean (F-measure)
4) Training time measured in milliseconds (ms) to build the classifiers
5) Classifiers content for the rule induction, Bagging and tree based
algorithms
These evaluation measures mathematical descriptions are given below:
(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)
where TP is the number of data examples correctly classified by class A, TN is
the number of data examples correctly classified by class -A, FP is the number of
A’s examples incorrectly classified as -A, and FN is the number of -A examples
incorrectly classified as A.
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Prior to running the ML learning algorithms against the BHP flooding
attacks dataset, we pre-processed the dataset using Correlation Features Sets
(CFS) to determine the most influential features [57]. CFS is a well-known feature
selection method which heuristically examines the correlation of each feature
with the class label in order to discard any redundant or low correlated features.
After running the CFS on the initial dataset, three features (Drop-Rate,
Bandwidth-Use, BHP-Flood) were identified to be more effective to combat the
BHP flood attack problem. Hence, we will utilize these features during the
training phase for the classifiers.

4.4

Results Analysis
Figure 4.2 highlights the classification accuracies derived by the ML

classifiers from the dataset. It is clear from the figure that the Bagging, rule
induction (RIDOR), and decision tree (C4.5) classifiers have higher prediction
rates than that of the remaining classifiers. Noticeably, the C4.5 algorithm
outperformed the remaining algorithms when it comes to predictive accuracy. To
be exact, its prediction accuracy is 4.66%, 14.52%, 20.84%, 1.68%, 26.42%, 39.07%,
18.05% higher than those of RIDOR, Naïve Bayes, Simple Logistic Regression,
Bagging, SVM-SMO, AdaBoost, and NN- MultilayerPerceptron, respectively. The
superiority of C4.5 may be due to the intensive backward and forward pruning
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implemented after constructing the tree. C4.5 trims sub-trees that lead to larger
errors, replacing them with more accurate leaves, resulting in concise, yet highly
predictive, classifiers. In addition, the C4.5 algorithm triggers an implicit
discretization procedure based on Entropy, converting continuous variables into
discrete ones prior to the training phase. This ensures small intervals for each
continuous attribute, easing the data processing, and ensuring its efficiency.
Finally, Bagging and RIROD classifiers seem competitive in the decision tree,
both algorithms using effective pruning procedures to cut down the number of
rules produced.

Figure 4.2 Classification accuracies in % derived by the ML
algorithms
Figure 4.3 displays the classifiers’ sizes for the top three predictive
classifiers (C4.5, Bagging, RIDOR). It is clear from the figure that Bagging derives
larger classifiers compared to both RIDOR and C4.5 algorithms. This is due to
the generation of multiple local classifiers, and the integration step forming a
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final tree structure, which may lead to many branches and leaves. The classifier
presented by RIDOR is the least predictive among those of the three algorithms,
yet it contains a concise set of rules. For the user’s perspective, a more concise set
of rules could make it easier for network administrators to understand and
manually control the BHP flooding attack problem. C4.5, on the other hand,
offers moderate-sized classifiers that have superiority in classification accuracy
over RIDOR and Bagging respectively. In fact, C4.5 covered more training
examples than RIDOR, discovering more rules that may contribute to the
increase in predictive performance.

Figure 4.3 The classifiers’ sizes of RIDOR, Bagging and C4.5
algorithms
Figures 4.4a - 4.4d show the true positives (TPs), false positives (FPs), true
negatives (TNs) and false negatives (FNs) respectively for the considered
algorithms on the BHP flood attack dataset. The TPs and TNs are consistent with
the classification accuracy rates derived beforehand, in which C4.5, Bagging and
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RIDOR achieved higher TPs than that of the remaining algorithms. For example,
RIDOR correctly classified “Block”, “No Block” and “M- No Block” class labels
without any error. However, for the hard-to-detect cases, i.e. the ones which

Figure 4.4a The TPs of the
ML algorithms

Figure 4.4b The FPs of the
ML algorithms

Figure 4.4c The TNs of the
ML algorithms

Figure 4.4d The FNs of the
ML algorithms

belong to the “M-Wait” class, 28 instances have been misclassified by RIDOR as
the “M=No Block” label. For the TNs results, AdaBoost algorithm seems have the
rates because it was unable to clearly differentiate among the four class labels in
particular M-Wait, which its instances have been completely misclassified to MNo Block class label.
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The results of the TPs, TNs, FNs and FPs show that “Block” and “No
Block” cases are easy to detect by the ML algorithms, but cases that belong to
class labels “M-Wait” and “M-No Block” are harder to be detected, due to
overlaps between these two class labels. To be precise, in terms of FPs, the three
least performed algorithms (AdaBoost, SVM-SMO, Logistic) are associated with
300, 204, and 254 misclassifications respectively. These figures clearly reveal the
reasons behind the low predictive rates of these three algorithms in detecting
difficult-to-classify cases of “M-Wait” and “M-No Block”. To overcome this issue
of overlapping between class labels, more data cases covering “M-No Block” and
“M-Wait” are needed, so the ML algorithms can further distinguish between
them during the learning phase. This is due to the fact that the misbehaving
nodes are further decomposed in the dataset into three sub-class labels, in order
to reflect the true nature of the problem and reduce overfitting during the
learning phase. Moreover, and in terms of FNs, decision tree and Bagging
algorithms consistently derived good results when compared with the remaining
algorithms. To be exact, Bagging algorithm only wrongly classified 11 instances 8
of which belong to the hard to classify class M-Wait. Typically, we do not desire
to end up with a binary classification problem in which the ML algorithm
decides whether the ingress node is behaving or misbehaving. However, we do
aim to understand to which degree the node is misbehaving, and if two nodes
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are misbehaving, which may be allowed to transmit data, and which should
delay in using their flooding or network utilization rates. Therefore, it was
necessary to further split the misbehaving class into multiple class labels during
the data collection phase.
Figure 4.5 shows three more types of measures: precision, recall, and Fmeasure. The precision results displayed in Figure 4.5 shows a consistency with
classification accuracy rates, and highlights that malicious ingress nodes are
harder to be detected than behaving ingress nodes, at least for the dataset and
algorithms used. Usually, high precision rates, such as in C4.5, RIDOR and
Bagging, relate to their low FPs. C4.5 achieved the largest precision and
AdaBoost the lowest. In the precision results, seven out of eight algorithms have
consistent results when compared to their accuracies, except for the AdaBoost
algorithm. The precision of AdaBoost declined significantly to 0.397 (39%) due to
a large number of FP cases, as shown in Figure 4.5. Precision shows the number
of correctly classified cases from all that have been classified. On the other hand,
recall results in the same figure denotes the number of correctly classified cases
in all cases intended to be correctly classified. In the recall results, all the ML
algorithms have consistent results when compared to their predictive accuracies.
To have a clearer insight into precision and recall alongside one another,
we generated the scores when using the F1 measure. The F1 score takes the
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weighted average of recall and precision (false negatives and false positives) into
consideration, especially when involving data such as our four unevenly
distributed class labels. In our study, we can observe that C4.5, RIDOR and
Bagging still generate highly competitive F1 scores compared to the remaining
considered algorithms on the BHP flood attack dataset.

Figure 4.5 The Precision, Recall and F1 scores of the ML algorithms
Lastly, Figure 4.6 depicts the runtime in millisecond (ms) taken from the ML
algorithms in constructing the classifiers. Here, the fastest algorithms were Naïve Bayes
and C4.5. Naive Bayes uses simple likelihood calculations for all variables in the test
dataset using their frequencies in the training dataset, hence no rule learning being
involved. Alternately, the C4.5 algorithm employs fast learning based on computing
Entropy for the variables in the training dataset to build tree based classifiers. Hence,
these two algorithms are quite efficient in building predictive classifiers in contrast to
alternative ML algorithms. The MultilayerPerceptron NN algorithm was the slowest
algorithm in building the classifier due to the exhaustive search this algorithm employs,
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which is based on pre-setting the desired expected error achieved. This often necessitates
repetitive training dataset scans.

Figure 4.6 The time in ms needed to build the classifiers of the ML
algorithms

4.5

Studies Related to Application of Machine Learning in Detection and

Classification Tasks
Despite the scarcity of literature, this section highlights these studies and
others related to primarily utilizing ML in different types of computer networks
[40, 91, 92, 93, 35, 41].
[40] investigated the problems of BHP flood attacks in OBS networks to
differentiate the types of data bursts, i.e. congestion or contention. A new metric
named “number of bursts between failures” (NBBF) was proposed to detect
which type of data bursts losses occur. In the process of classifying these data
bursts,

the

authors

applied

two

methods:

unsupervised

expectation

maximization (EM) and a supervised Hidden Markov Chain (HMC). Reported
107

results showed that when both methods are integrated, the accuracy of
distinguishing among types of bursts losses is increased.
[91] investigated the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) flood attacks
on the transport and application layers, and developed a detection mechanism
that analyzes the traffic according to types of packets, packet arrival rate and
server capacity. The detection mechanism relies on recording and monitoring
information related to address pair (source and destination), the type of packet,
the port addresses of the source and destination among others. The key to
success of [91]’s method is the predefined setting value of the server capacity. No
experiments have been conducted to reveal the pros and cons of the detection
method of DDoS flood attacks.
[92] investigated the problems of reducing flood attacks and other service
attacks in computer networks using ML. These types of attacks normally belong
to DDoS flooding attacks, and other risk that impair Internet security. The aim
was to identify the misbehaving sources (nodes) in order to block their messages
from their intended destinations. In the learning model proposed, elements of
the network share behavior information about the network’s performance, so the
classifier may amend or enhance the model’s behavior by blocking potentially
detrimental messages. Reported experimental results revealed a 95% detection
rate using a probabilistic classifier.
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[93] reviewed different learning mechanisms utilized to detect DDoS
flooding attacks, in particular, SYN flooding. This type of flooding attack harms
the network performance: when packets flood the network, many users may
suffer server access delays. In some cases, the server shuts down entirely from
SYN flooding attacks. The authors of [93] critically analyzed different approaches
related to ML, statistical analysis, and router based among others.
[35] adopted the Naïve Bayes (NB) probabilistic classification algorithm
[48] to detect the type of Internet traffic. Before applying NB, features related to
traffic flow such as port identification, elapsed time between two consecutive
flows, and the flow length among others, were collected. The type of traffic flow
variable was assigned by a domain expert in the dataset, and NB was applied to
generate probabilistic classification systems to predict the traffic flow variable.
The classification system derived by NB shows low predictive rates, but when
the authors utilized feature selection methods prior to the training phase, the
accuracy rate of the classification systems was improved.
The IP traffic classification problem was studied in the context of ML by
[41]. The authors surveyed and compared the performance of supervised and
unsupervised ML algorithms, and highlighted the role of feature assessment in
pre-processing the IP traffic dataset. Results showed that NB, EM and decision
tree algorithms often produce consistent results, with high classification accuracy
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for the IP Internet traffic problem. Moreover, a number of recommendations
have been highlighted based on the survey, such as:
1) ML algorithms generate different results for the IP traffic problem because
of the different learning mechanisms they employ in deriving the
classification systems. Hence, hybrid learning seems appropriate for
future investigation
2) Different requirements are sought by ML algorithms because learning
environments differ from one algorithm to another, as well as
configurations
3) It is essential to investigate real time learning, at least for the IP Internet
traffic classification problem, in which the ML will, while in progress,
derive the classifiers rather than using static datasets
4) Feature selection methods can be useful in some Internet application
problems such as IP Internet traffic classification
The majority of recent research contends that utilizing ML techniques in
computer networks relates to DDoS flood attacks using primarily adaptive
distributed mechanisms, while other studies investigated data traffic analysis.
This study investigates an entirely new issue – BHP flood attacks in OBS
networks. We believe that ML has not yet been adopted to develop predictive
models to counter BHP flood attacks in OBS networks.
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4.6

Summary
In spite of the many benefits of an OBS network, such as bandwidth

efficiency, economic values and resiliency, OBS networks can become vulnerable
when burst loss occurs during ingress nodes sending data, causing BHP flood
attacks. This problem may deteriorate the overall network’s performance, due to
the allocating of resources without proper usage. BHP flood attacks hinder the
QoS of the OBS network, hence potentially causing a severe problem – the Denial
of Service (DoS). This paper investigated the aforementioned issue by applying
Machine Learning to automatically detect misbehaving ingress nodes, and
blocking them in a preliminary stage. We evaluated various ML algorithms via
simulation data, involving more than two ingress nodes and over 530 runs. The
aim was to classify ingress nodes as accurately as possible, using variables
related to their performance, such as packet drop rate, bandwidth used, and
average delay time among others. Experimental results from a processed dataset
related to BHP flood attacks showed that rule based classifiers, in particular
decision trees (C4.5), Bagging, and RIDOR, consistently derive high predictive
classifiers compared to alternate ML algorithms, including AdaBoost, Logistic
Regression, Naïve Bayes, SVM-SMO and NN-MultilayerPerceptron. Moreover,
the harmonic mean, recall and precision results of the rule based and tree
classifiers were more competitive than those of the remaining ML algorithms.
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Lastly, the runtime results measured in terms of millisecond showed that
decision tree classifiers are not only more predictive, but are also more efficient
than the rest of the algorithms. Thus, this is the most appropriate technique for
classifying ingress nodes to combat the BHP flood attack problem. This paper is
one of the initial attempts on adopting ML techniques to automatically classify
ingress nodes in OBS networks.
In the near future, we intend to build a new rule-based classifier using the
decision tree, and embed it inside the simulator to detect misbehaving nodes
during the simulation phase.
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